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INTRODUCTION
International law is increasingly "judicialized." A once straightforward and
simple world of unconditional State sovereignty evolves before our eyes into a
maze of regional courts,' State-to-State arbitrations, specialized substantive
adjudications, international criminal tribunals,4 and human rights commissions.
This Article takes as its subject one particular kind of international adjudicative
tribunal that has become increasingly important in recent years: international
mass claims commissions (IMCCs). IMCCs are ad hoc tribunals set up for
adjudicating large-scale violations of international law, typically arising out of
cross-border conflicts between two or more sovereign States. There have been
1. Regional courts include the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the
Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice, among others. See generally Courts and
Tribunals of Regional Economic Communities, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/
regional-communities (last visited Mar. 2, 2018). The Court of Justice of the European Union, for
example, derives its jurisdiction from several different treaties. See European Union Competences of the
Court of Justice of the European Union, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 2017), http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuld=FTU1.3.IO.html (summarizing these treaties and
their grants ofjurisdiction).
2. Fora for State-to-State arbitration include the Permanent Court of Arbitration, PERMANENT
CT. ARB., https://pca-cpa.org (seat of public international law arbitrations) (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispu~e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); and ad hoc
tribunals. See also Gary Bom, A New Generation ofInternational Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775 (2012);
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, INT'L INST.
SUSTAINABLE DEv. (Oct. 2014), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-
state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties.pdf, Charles H. Brower It, Arbitration, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Feb. 2007), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-ell?rskey=8HS7wB&result-7&prd=EPIL.
3. Specialized adjudication occurs at tribunals such as the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, INT'L TRIBUNAL L. SEA, https://www.itios.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, see Dispute Settlement, supra note 2; and the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism,
Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Overview-of-the-Dispute-Settlement-Provisions (last visited Mar. 6,
2018).
4. International criminal tribunals include the International Criminal Court, INT'L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int (last visited Mar. 6, 2018), which is a permanent standing court, as well as various
ad hoc tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.rscsl.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGO., http://www.icty.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2018);
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
http://unictr.unmict.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS CTS. CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en (last visited Mar.
6, 2018); and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., https://www.stl-tsl.org/en
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018). See generally Wolfgang Schomburg & Jan Nemitz, International Criminal
Courts and Tribunals, Procedure, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Dec. 2010), http://opil.ouplaw.comlview/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-el678.
5. Examples of human rights commissions include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
INTER-AM. CT. HUMAN RTS., http://www.corteidh.or.cr (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); the European Court
of Human Rights, EUR. CT. HUMAN RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS.,
http://www.achpr.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). See generally Regional Systems, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE
CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
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three tribunals fitting this description, all established in the last four decades: the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC), and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC).6
IMCCs are the behemoths of international litigation-large, slow-moving,
lumbering beasts that maneuver awkwardly and are almost impossible to steer.
As the name suggests, IMCCs are huge. The numbers of claims that they are
called upon to resolve can run easily into the millions and the awards into the
billions.7 The legal issues that they deal with are complex and the administrative
difficulties are staggering.8 Some IMCCs seemingly last forever: the shortest of
the modem IMCCs lasted nearly a decade, with the longest just now winding
down after almost forty years in action.9 And the legal precedents that they
announce live on, often being disproportionately influential.10 Given their size,
6. See infra Section II.A. Another, somewhat similar, example is the Commission for Real
Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, created pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreements
in the aftermath of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which was responsible for settling ownership of
real property that had been seized or abandoned during the war. However, this Commission did not have
full adjudicative authority and had a very limited range of remedies. See Hans van Houtte, Mass Property
Claim Resolution in a Post-War Society: The Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 625, 626 (1999).
7. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) has successfully resolved over 3,900 claims and is
still hearing cases in The Hague. See About the Tribunal, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,
https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/A-About.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). To date, the Tribunal has
awarded more than $2.5 billion to U.S. nationals and companies. An overview of the Tribunal is available
through the U.S. State Department at Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/3199.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). The U.N. Compensation Commission
(UNCC) processed about 2.7 million claims seeking more than $350 billion in compensation between
1991 and 2005. See WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION: DESIGNING
COMPENSATION AFTER CONFLICT xi (Timothy J. Feighery, Christopher S. Gibson & Trevor M. Rajah
eds., 2015); David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Tradition of
International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1994); see also Timothy J. Feighery,
The United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE RULES, PRACTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 515 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012).
8. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council
Resolution 687 (1991), T 21, U.N. Doc. S/2255 (May 2, 1991) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General Report
on UNCC] (discussing administrative difficulties with managing "tens of thousands of claims"); Lee M.
Caplan, Arbitrator Challenges at the Iran-US. Claims Tribunals, in CHALLENGES AND RECUSALS OF
JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 115 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2015)
(illustrating the political arrangements that were necessary to administer the claims); Sandrine Giroud &
Sam Moss, Mass Claims Processes Under Public International Law, in COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE
481, 497 (Eva Lein et al. eds., 2015) (discussing difficulties related to the "sheer number of claims" and
obstacles to obtaining evidence); Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations
Compensation Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 178-80 (2009) (discussing in part the
complexity of claims at the UNCC).
9. The IUSCT has been in operation for almost forty years, having been established in 1981.
See IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.net (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). On the other hand, the
UNCC operated for fourteen years (from 1991 to 2005), and the EECC operated for about a decade (from
2000 to 2009). See U.N. COMPENSATION COMMISSION, http://www.uncc.ch (last visited Mar. 6, 2018);
Case View: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, PERMANENT CT. ARB., https://pcacases.com/web/
view/71 (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
10. Legal rulings from mass compensation commissions "while not binding, are often
influential." HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & EDDA KRISTJANSDOTTIR, INTERNATIONAL MASS CLAIMS
PROCESSES: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 118 (2007). Though there is not a formal rule of stare
decisis, in practice, decisions have been treated as precedent. See id. at 118-19, 122-23; Arturo J. Carrillo,
Transnational Mass Claims Processes (TMCPs) in International Law and Practice, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 343, 404-05 (2010); see also CYMIE R. PAYNE & PETER H. SAND, GULF WAR REPARATIONS AND THE
UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 273 (2011) (discussing the UNCC's
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significance, and staying power, IMCCs teeter on the border between garden-
variety one-shot arbitrations and standing international tribunals charged with
setting the future course of international law."
Their responsibilities may be enormous, but their resources-tangible or
intangible-are sometimes not. As ad hoc tribunals, IMCCs have to earn the
recognition that standing courts automatically receive from the international
community. Launched with nothing for credentials other than the agreement of
the States that created them, IMCCs have a tenure that is defined solely by
reference to the parties' wishes. 12 Typically, the tribunals' decisions are not
reviewable, depriving IMCC awards of whatever affirmation an appellate
process might provide.
Moreover, the claims they hear are mostly ones that would not get an
audience before any other international tribunal. Their mandates often demand
seemingly impossible feats, such as adjudication of tens of thousands of
undocumented small claims arising during armed conflict in unfamiliar portions
of the globe.13 The usual punctilious standards of evidentiary proof may be a
wishful fantasy. 14 To obtain funding, some IMCCs must constantly ask the
parties themselves, whose enthusiasm for the litigation cannot be relied upon.15
influence on decisionmakers responsible for compensating victims at all levels); John P. Gaffney,
Precedent in the United Nations Compensation Commission, 5 TRANSNAT'L DISPUTE MGMT. 1 (2008).
11. It should therefore be no surprise that they attract top arbitrators. Claims commission
arbitrators have included well-known academics, former International Court of Justice judges, former
Supreme Court Justices, law firm partners, former presidents of the American Society of International
Law, and former claims commission arbitrators. See Arbitrators, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,
https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/A-Arbitrators.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2018); Commissioners, U.N.
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, http://www.uncc.ch/commissioners (last visited Apr. 20, 2018); Case
View: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 9.
12. For example, the Algiers Agreement of December 12, 2000, which established the EECC,
required that the Commission endeavor to complete its work within three years of the parties' deadline to
file claims. Agreement Between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Eth.-Eri., arts. 5(8), 5(12), Dec. 12, 2000, 2138 U.N.T.S. 93, 97-98
[hereinafter Algiers 11]. Additionally, the UNCC completed its work in 2005 when it had finished
processing all claims. Press Release, U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Governing Council of United Nations
Compensation Commissions Has Concluded Its Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. PR/2005/8 (June 30,
2005), http://www.uncc.ch/sites/default/files/attachments/documents/56%20close.pdf. The UNCC
remains in operation only "to correct duplicate awards and to make additional payments." Carrillo, supra
note 10, at 372.
13. For example, the EECC was established following a ruinous boundary war that resulted in
significant loss of life, personal injury, and economic damage. The conflict killed approximately 70,000
people, and up to another 350,000 were internally displaced. Aaron Maasho, Eritrea, Ethiopia Trade
Blame for Border Clashes, REUTERS (June 13, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea-
attacks/eritrea-ethiopia-trade-blame-for-border-clashes-idUSKCNYZOIL; Nita Bhalla, War
"Devastated" Ethiopian Economy, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
1476618.stm. The UNCC also had a monumental task in processing the variety of losses resulting from
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Commission was responsible for processing over 2.7 million
claims seeking more than $350 billion in compensation over just fourteen years. Geoffrey Senogles, The
United Nations Compensation Commission's Utilisation of Experts, in INSIDE THE BLACK Box: How
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS OPERATE AND REACH THEIR DECISIONS 93, 93 (Bernhard Berger & Michael E.
Schneider eds., 2013).
14. The UNCC, for instance, had significant evidentiary difficulties because people often lacked
proper documentation about their claims and because the conflict destroyed much of the evidence. See
infra note 36.
15. There are a variety of models by which IMCCs are funded. For example, the UNCC had a
Understanding "IMCCs"
Despite such profound challenges, these tribunals purport to issue rulings
that bind sovereign States. 16 With their promise of "do it yourself' justice,
IMCCs seem to display optimism about the potential of international law-an
optimism that is all too rare these days. But do IMCCs deliver the goods?
The conclusions reached below are not entirely encouraging. As is
generally recognized in the academic literature, a variety of community interests
support both the establishment of international tribunals and the widespread
recognition of the decisions they reach.17 Such a variety of interests is not only
desirable but arguably necessary. The more interests at stake, the more likely that
at least one actor, somewhere in the community, will find a particular IMCC
worthy of support. The result, however, is that the various actors in the
international system who are called on for support will very likely have different
reasons for supporting mass adjudication. The interests of the international
community are neither identical to the interests of the parties nor homogeneous.
In particular, the international community is typically just as interested in putting
an end to the conflict as it is in addressing the merits of individual complaints,
and actual payment of the individual awards may matter even less.
This Article is a methodological hybrid: partly descriptive, partly
analytical, and partly predictive. It seeks to describe and analyze the IUSCT, the
UNCC, and the EECC in such a way as to facilitate predictions about the likely
outcome of future IMCCs. It does so in part by generalizing from the experience
of the three IMCCs. This Article also explores what certain kinds of actors, with
certain motives and interests, are likely to do or say under certain circumstances.
It is believed that much of the puzzling international conduct surrounding this
relatively new form of adjudication makes sense upon examination. This Article
aims to spell out the hidden logic of IMCCs, to provide examples from existing
stable source of capital that was automatically diverted to pay successful claims and operation costs. The
IUSCT, on the other hand, had an initial pool of funds but was forced to rely on the parties' commitment
to replenish funds as they ran out. For a more detailed discussion of the funding of IMCCs, see LEA
BRILMAYER, C-IARA GIORGETTI & LORRAINE CHARLTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS COMMISSIONS:
RIGHTING WRONGS AFTER CONFLICT 140-66 (2017).
16. For example, the Algiers Agreement of December 12, 2000, creating the EECC, stated that
decisions and awards of the Commission are "final and binding" and "[t]he parties agree to honor all
decisions and to pay any monetary awards rendered against them promptly." Algiers 11, supra note 12,
art. 5(17). For similar provisions in the instruments that created other IMCCs, see Article 4 of the Claims
Settlement Declaration that created the IUSCT, which provides that "[a]ll decisions and awards of the
Tribunal shall be final and binding." Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S., art. IV, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M.
230 (1981), 1 Iran-U.S. CTR 9 (1983) [hereinafter IUSCT Claims Settlement Declaration]. For another
example, see paragraphs 16 through 19 of the U.N. Security Council Resolution that created the UNCC.
S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 18, (Apr. 8, 1991) ("[d]ecid[ing] also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims
that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund"). Even
international courts that do not deal with States as parties have the power to bind States. For example,
States that are parties to the Rome Statute have obligations pertaining to investigating, gathering evidence,
and arresting and surrendering individuals to the International Criminal Court. See generally Valerie
Oosterveld, Mike Perry & John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal
Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 767 (2002).
17. See infra Section I.B. For a further discussion of the various interests that States have when
considering an IMCC, see BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 193-209.
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experience, and to make predictive claims that will be useful either to scholars
or diplomats considering how best to approach the problem of mass loss during
international conflict.
An important question that is likely to arise in future practice is whether,
in a particular case, a claims commission is likely to produce the desired results.
Studying the three IMCCs can offer some generalized insights about the
circumstances in which successful completion of an IMCC's mandate is most
likely. For example, the IUSCT and the UJNCC were different from the EECC
because the States had the resources to pay compensation.18 Perhaps even more
importantly, the two tribunals were allowed to exert effective control over these
resources by sequestering a fund needed to pay the judgment. At the EECC,
neither State had the financial capacity or natural resources for an IMCC to
sequester.19 In addition, the higher monetary value of most of the claims, the
greater ability to hire lawyers that follows from these higher stakes, and the level
of sophistication in the world of arbitration when the victims are wealthy
businesspeople rather than subsistence farmers and herdsmen meant that in the
former two tribunals, claims might be filed and adjudicated individually. 20 These
factors help to explain how "compensation" never reached the individual victims
in the EECC.
One consideration likely to be important in the prediction about likely
success or failure of an IMCC is the existence of objectives other than
compensation when establishing an IMCC. The EECC was created as part of a
peace process designed to terminate a bloody war that threatened to destabilize
the entire Horn of Africa.2 1 Throughout the negotiations, it was entirely possible
that fighting would resume with disastrous consequences for the region.
Powerful third-party States that had a vested interest in legal resolution were in
a position to pressure the parties to go along with a claims process, even though
it had little promise of achieving the promised compensation. These factors,
among others, explain why claims were paid in only two of the three IMCCs
studied, providing a basis for prediction about the likelihood of future IMCC
success.
Part I sets out the direct compensation interests of the parties that IMCCs
are ordinarily designed to serve as well as the indirect public interests of the
community. It identifies the interests that IMCCs serve and the international
actors for whom those interests matter. Part II then applies these arguments to a
particular issue that IMCCs face within the context of enforcing awards. Looking
specifically at the IUSCT, the UNCC, and the EECC, this Part illustrates how
the first two tribunals ended with full compensation for meritorious claims, while
the EECC did not, largely due to the parties' and the international community's
mixed interests in resolving the Eritrean-Ethiopian dispute. These divergent
interests were reflected in the drafting of the agreements to form the three
18. See infra Section II.B.
19. See infra Section II.B.2.
20. See infra Section II.B.3.
21. See infra Section II.C.
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commissions. Reading between the lines, the IUSCT and UNCC agreements
reveal an expectation that compensation would actually be paid, while the EECC
agreement projects a lack of optimism on that very issue.
Despite IMCC proponents' high hopes, the circumstances in which it is
realistic to expect compensation through international mass adjudication-the
ostensible primary objective of IMCCs-are limited. Secondary objectives may
supply sufficient justification, but this cannot be taken for granted. Studying
IMCCs reveals the intrinsic limitations on international adjudication. We are
wrong if we assume that a problem is solved simply because it has been handed
over to an international tribunal. With IMCCs (as with international law more
generally) enthusiasm and optimism are appropriate-but only when
administered with a dose of cautious realism.
I. INTERNATIONAL MASS CLAIMS COMMISSIONS AS SEMI-PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
IMCCs promise an attractive opportunity to validate the utility of
international adjudication. Upon examination, the indicators all seem positive:
IMCCs, when they function properly, not only provide compensation to the
victims for whose direct benefit they were created but also promote the public
benefits that international adjudication supposedly promotes to a wide range of
States.
A. The Modern Claims Commission
Historically, States have not typically been inclined to resolve their
compensation claims through claims commissions, let alone mass claims
commissions. Claims commissions existed historically, of course, and some of
them were substantial operations. 22 However, they were not designed to resolve
all claims for violations of international law. Mostly, claims commissions were
designed to manage mid- to large-sized commercial claims-and generally they
involved the expectation of State settlement of claims rather than case-by-case
determination of the merits of an individual's claim.23
Only in the last fifty years or so have mass claims commissions been
recognized as a standard tool of international conflict resolution. At these
modern tribunals, jurisdiction tends to be broadly defined to include all claims
based on violations of international law occurring as incidental to the particular
conflict at issue. 24 Certainly, this includes lost property and commercial claims,
22. For a history of claims commissions, see Rudolf Dolzer, Mixed Claims Commissions, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (May 2011), http://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e64.
23. Only States were able to file claims with nineteenth-century claims commissions. Id. ¶¶ 17-
18. However, this has changed more recently. For example, the IUSCT, created in the early 1980s,
permitted individuals to appear if the amount of their claims was greater than $250,000. Id. ¶ 18.
24. For instance, the EECC gave the Commission jurisdiction over violations of international
humanitarian law and other violations of international law. See Algiers II, supra note 12, arts. 5(1), 5(12);
see also SEAN D. MURPHY, WON KIDANE & THOMAS R. SNIDER, LITIGATING WAR: MASS CIVIL INJURY
AND THE ERITREA-ETHIOPIA CLAIMS COMMISSION 66-68 (2013).
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but it also includes claims for violations of human rights and humanitarian law,
as well as treaties in effect between the States in question.
For present purposes, "IMCC" includes ad hoc tribunals set up after
international conflicts to remedy large-scale violations of international law
through the provision of compensation. 2 5 As explained above, there are three
modem examples of IMCCs, all of which were established in the last four
decades; indeed, two of them were established post-2000. The IUSCT was
established to handle claims arising out of the Iranian Revolution and the ensuing
occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran; 2 6 the UNCC was established for
claims arising out of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait; and the EECC was
established for claims arising out of the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia
and Eritrea.2 7 The proposed definition of IMCC does not include non-binding
mediation,28 truth and reconciliation commissions, 29 criminal tribunals (whether
25. A more detailed and technically precise definition is provided in BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI
& CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 5-6:
IMCCs are adhoc bodies and their structure, jurisdiction, procedure and ability to remedy vary
considerably. Indeed, there is no uniform, formal definition of IMCCs. They make up an
eclectic and unique group, characterized by important shared characteristics. First, IMCCs are
binding dispute resolution mechanisms; second, they are structured and act like judicial bodies;
third, they are created after an event of international relevance; fourth, they are international
law instruments; fifth, they engage the responsibility of states; and sixth, they are ad hoc
institutions.
26. For an excellent overview, see Jeremy K. Sharpe, Iran-United States Claims Tribunals, in
THE RULES, PRACTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 545 (Chiara
Giorgetti ed., 2012). See also THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 (Richard Lillich
ed., 1984) (reviewing the establishment and initial jurisprudence of the Tribunal).
27. For background on the establishment of these three IMCCs, see infra Section II.A.
28. Unlike non-binding mediation, IMCCs issue binding decisions. See supra note 16.
Additionally, the definition of IMCCs provided supra in note 25 specifies that IMCCs are binding dispute
resolution mechanisms.
29. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are typically created after a violent international or
domestic event that significantly impacted a State. The fundamental functions of these commissions are
to provide an instrument of reconciliation and closure to the parties involved through a process of
dialogue, and to create a historical record. IMCCs, on the other hand, are adjudicative bodies and are
therefore inherently different from Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Examples of Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions include the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission created
after the abolition of apartheid, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc (last visited Mar. 6, 2018), and the
Argentinian National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons created after the Dirty War and the
military dictatorship that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983, see Truth Commission: Argentina, U.S.
INST. FOR PEACE, https://www.usip.org/publications/1983/12/truth-commission-argentina (last visited
Mar. 6, 2018).
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standing3 0 or ad hoc3 1), or domestic legal mechanisms such as class actions. 32
Mass claims commissions have been, or are being, considered for a variety
of claims: injury and death during a cholera epidemic introduced into Haiti by a
U.N. peacekeeping operation following an earthquake; 3 3 the seizure of property
during the seventy-year duration of the Arab-Israeli conflict; 34 and worldwide
economic damage due to climate change.35 Although the momentum now seems
30. Criminal tribunals apply international criminal law-a specialized body of law-and
typically have higher standards of proof than IMCCs. They typically do not award compensation to the
victims. Generally, some sort of prosecutor's office is responsible for bringing charges. For reasons such
as these, they are quite different from IMCCs. Standing criminal tribunals include the International
Criminal Court. See INT'L CRIM. CT., supra note 4.
31. Ad hoc criminal tribunals include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
and others. See supra note 4. These tribunals deal with individual responsibility, not with reviewing the
acts of States. At times, these mechanisms are created in parallel with other claims commissions but
remain separate. For instance, several real-property claims processes ran in parallel to the ICTY. These
included the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (CRPC), established by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. The CRPC was headquartered
in Sarajevo and had a mixed composition of nine members: six internationals appointed by the president
of the European Court of Human Rights, and six nationals, two appointed by the Republika Srpska and
four appointed by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The CRPC dealt only with mass property
claims resulting from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. See van Houtte, supra note 6.
32. Domestic compensation mechanisms are numerous. In the United States, for example, the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), an agency of the Department of Justice, settles claims
that U.S. nationals have against foreign governments. The jurisdiction of the FCSC is conferred by
Congress, through an international claims settlement agreement, or at the request of the Secretary of State.
Its funds derive from either Congressional appropriations, international claims settlements, or from
liquidation of foreign assets in the United States. Completed FCSC programs include claims against the
Federal Republic of Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and Albania. See Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission of the U.S., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/fcsc/about-commission (last
visited Apr. 20, 2018). Although international in origin, these claims are fully addressed and resolved in
the domestic context by a U.S. government agency. Other claims commissions are created to deal with
wholly domestic events such as the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, a $20 billion fund to settle claims resulting
from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See, e.g., Catherine Clifford, BP Oil Spill Fund: $5 Billion in
Claims Paid Out, CNN MONEY (Aug. 23, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/23/smallbusiness/
BP oilspillclaims/index.htm. Such commissions handle entirely domestic claims; they may use mass
claims procedures but have little else in common with IMCCs.
33. The Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti has advocated for the creation of an
independent standing claims commission to compensate Haitian cholera victims. See Justice for Haiti
Cholera Victims: The Lawsuit Against the United Nations, INST. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI 3
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Cholera-Litigation-FAQ-12.16.
2014.pdf; see also Muneer I. Ahmad & Alice M. Miller, It's Time for the UN To Compensate Haitians
for Its Cholera Disaster, NATION (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/its-time-for-the-
united-nations-to-compensate-haiti-for-its-cholera-disaster.
34. See, e.g., Framework Agreement for Permanent Status, Discussion Draft, art. 7, May 20,
2000 (provided only as an online appendix-Appendix Z-to WILLIAM B. QUANDT, PEACE PROCESS:
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967 (3d ed. 2005),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Appendix-Z.pdf, and proposing the creation of
an international commission to decide Palestinian compensation claims); U.N. Conciliation Comm'n for
Palestine, Historical Survey of Efforts of the U.N. Conciliation Comm'n for Palestine to Secure the
Implementation of Paragraph 11 of Gen. Assembly Resol. 194 (III), 1 20, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.25/W/81/Rev.2 (Oct. 2, 1961) (discussing in part the ability of a claims commission to assist with
determining compensation for the parties' financial losses "incurred during the recent fighting"); Leila
Hilal, Reparation for Lost Palestinian Property Inside Israel: A Review of International Developments,
33 JERUSALEM Q. 56 (2008) (discussing the applicability of a claims commission to the Israel-Palestine
conflict).
35. See, e.g., Maxine Burkett, Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation
Mechanism for Small Island States, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 81 (2015) (proposing a claims
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
to be growing, it will probably be many decades before we can discern whether
mass claims commissions have become a standard component of the
international lawyer's toolkit. However, the increased incidence and visibility of
tribunals of this sort are undeniable.
The increased activity in the mass claims context is partially rooted in our
newfound facility with handling mass paperwork. It is hard to imagine creating
an institution such as the 1991 UNCC five decades earlier. The claims numbered
in the millions, many of them small in size and lacking conventional
documentation.3 6 How would it have been possible to collect, process, prove,
and pay all of these claims in an era of manual typewriters and carbon paper?
Such a project would have been largely unthinkable in a world without the
Internet, email, digital scanners, and laptops-a world in which smartphones
were familiar mainly to readers of Dick Tracy cartoons.3 7
But there is more to this new development than laptops and iPhones. It
seems clear that the interests favoring the creation and success of IMCCs are
both substantial and widespread. The increasing prevalence of IMCCs strongly
suggests that these tribunals are widely believed to be somehow useful. But for
what? And to whom?
To a certain degree, the objectives of IMCCs are the same as those
underlying other sorts of international tribunals. Compensation and deterrence,
for example, are also goals of various human rights tribunals and international
courts of general jurisdiction.38 However, these objectives may take a different
form or have a different priority than IMCCs; the reason that IMCCs are formed
is that no existing tribunal can be expected to do the job.39
B. Primary and Secondary Objectives
IMCCs are formed at the initiative of the States that sign what are, in effect,
commission to compensate small island States); Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1605 (2006) (discussing which types of environmental harms could
be addressed by a compensation system such as a claims commission).
36. The UNCC received approximately 2.69 million claims. The Claims, U.N. COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, http://www.uncc.ch/claims (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). Lack of documentation was a key
challenge for the UNCC. Many of the individuals who submitted claims had fled their homes in a hurry,
bringing little or no documentation with them, and the looting and destruction of property destroyed much
evidence. John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing of Rights
Between Individual Claimants and the Government oflraq, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 141,
153 (2005); see also U.N. Comp. Comm'n Governing Council, Rep. and Recommendations Made by the
Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the First Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages
Above US$100,000 (Category "D" Claims), T[72, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1998/1 (Feb. 3, 1998)
(acknowledging that "[i]n many cases, relevant documents do not exist, have been destroyed, or were left
behind by claimants who fled Kuwait or Iraq").
37. See, e.g., The Dick Tracy Show: Phony Pharmers (United Productions of America 1961).
38. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) are both authorized to award compensation. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Award ofCompensation
by International Tribunals in Inter-State Cases: ICJ Decision in the Diallo Case, EJIL: TALK! (June 21,
2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/award-of-compensation-by-international-tribunals-in-inter-state-cases-icj-
decision-in-the-diallo-case.
39. The ICJ, for example, may order compensation for States parties on theory of diplomatic
representation, but individualized compensation will not be awarded to particular victims.
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arbitration agreements. The commissioners who hear and decide cases are
chosen by the parties, both claimants and respondents. Any compensation that is
recovered goes to the individual claimants and the States of which they are
nationals. Clearly, strong private interests are at stake. Yet IMCCs (like all ad
hoc international adjudications) depend on the international community for
support. They purport to make judgments that are binding against sovereign
States that will be recognized by the international community at large. Third
States may be called on to assist with funding or expertise. Why does the private
choice of State parties looking for a private benefit-compensation-entitle
those private parties to the assistance of the international public?
Standing international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice
(IC), are typically established by a general multilateral agreement, a source of
legitimacy that is not available to IMCCs. 40 One can point to the consent that the
parties give in establishing their tribunal, but the more that an IMCC affects third
States' interests, the less that consent-based reasoning does to make its acts
legitimate.41
The justification for the international system's authority is already tenuous
enough; critics accuse supra-national organizations like the United Nations or
the European Union of being undemocratic and therefore illegitimate.4 2 But ad
hoc IMCCs-large, long-lived, and empowered to decide important legal
issues-test the limits. The widespread and varied nature of the interests that
IMCCs potentially serve is key to their acceptance and ability to marshal support.
The power and influence of IMCCs depend on the extent to which they further
the interests of both the State and private parties in the world community as a
whole.
IMCCs have no single purpose that sets the standard against which they
should be judged. Although their ostensible purpose is to provide compensation,
different international actors support IMCCs for different reasons. Whether a
particular IMCC is viewed as a success or a failure may depend on whom you
ask and that international actor's interests and expectations.
The interests that might be served by the creation of a claims commission
40. The ICJ was established through the ICJ Statute, which forms part of the U.N. Charter. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933. The International Criminal
Court is another example of a standing tribunal that was established through multilateral agreement. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, openedfor signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. IMCCs,
however, are not standing tribunals and may be set up with varying levels of consent. See infra note 61.
41. For example, decisions of mass claims commissions can affect a State's nationals through
economic effects, such as higher taxes necessitated by the government having to pay a large award. See
infra note 53. In contrast, arbitration decisions generally do not affect non-parties. See Yuliya Zeynalova,
The Law on Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Judgements: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?,
31 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 150, 187 (2013) ("[Iinternational arbitral awards ... generally do not affect non-
parties who did not agree to be bound by the arbitration.").
42. For a discussion of these criticisms, see, e.g., Madeline Albright, Think Again: The United
Nations, FOREIGN POL'Y, (Oct. 29, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/29/think-again-the-united-
nations; James Arkedis, It's Time for a New United Nations, ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2013/09/its-time-for-a-new-united-nations/279738;
Vaungh Miller & Jon Lunn, The European Union: A Democratic Institution? (House of Commons
Research Paper 14/25, Apr. 29, 2014).
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are enormously varied, and some are more common and central than others. 4 3
There are at least four different types of basic objectives that IMCCs seek to
promote: compensation, retribution, deterrence, and closure. The first of these is
ostensibly primary-after all, what is being assessed is a mass compensation
commission-and the other three are secondary. The four overlap in the sense
that several different objectives may be at stake in any particular case. But they
are conceptually distinct and do not necessarily coincide.
1. Compensation
In the present context, compensation refers to an award pursuant to a
determination of wrongdoing that requires payment to the victims of the
violation. Compensation is designed to put the victim back in the position he or
she would have been in had no violation occurred; that is, compensation is
intended to make the victim whole.4 The direct interest in compensation is held
by the injured individual or (under a theory of diplomatic representation) the
State of which the claimant is a national.
The interest in compensation exists only where the injured party has a
meritorious legal claim; it does not come into existence simply because the
claimant has suffered a loss. For an award to be justified as compensation, there
must be a valid legal reason that the State charged with bearing the loss is
required to pay. The private interest in compensation therefore requires that
meritorious claims be recognized and that the claimant's award actually be paid.
Compensation is the most obvious objective of an IMCC. Indeed, the
names given to certain claims commissions make explicit reference to the
objective of "compensation" while others imply a compensatory objective by
inclusion of the word "claims."45 Compensation is the only interest that we have
included as part of our definition of IMCCs; a tribunal would not qualify under
43. In addition to the interests discussed here, other interests include cementing peaceful
relations between the parties by providing a forum for lawful interaction, truth-telling to set the historical
record straight for future generations, and satisfying one of the parties such that it is willing to put an end
to whatever conflict is causing the damage in question. See BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra
note 15, at 239-41.
44. See Stephan Wittich, Compensation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (May 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1025; see also Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J.
Rep. 7, ¶ 152 (Sept. 25) ("It is a well-established rule of international law that an injured State is entitled
to obtain compensation from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the
damage caused by it."); Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13) ("[R]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.").
45. Commissions that have the word "compensation" in their title include the UNCC and the
German Forced Labour Compensation Programme, the latter of which was created by the International
Organization for Migration. See German Forced Labour Compensation Programme (GFLCP), INT'L
ORG. FOR MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/German-Forced-
Labour-Compensation-Programme-GFLCP.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). Commissions with the word
"claims" in their title include the IUSCT; the EECC; the Commission for Real Property Claims of
Displaced Persons, see van Houtte, supra note 6; and the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant
Accounts in Switzerland II, CLAIMS RESOL. TRIBUNAL FOR DORMANT ACCOUNTS SWITZ.,
http://www.crt-ii.org/_crt-i/frame.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
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this definition if it did not set out to compensate. By definition, therefore,
compensation is ordinarily the primary interest furthered by claims commissions.
2. Retribution
A close analog of compensation is retribution, or punishment for unlawful
conduct that causes harm. Retribution goes hand in hand with compensation;
retribution and compensation are different ways of characterizing the same legal
consequence of the same wrongful act. The defendant pays the claimant's
damages (compensation) and is both simultaneously and commensurately
punished (retribution).
Retribution means depriving the perpetrator of the benefit, if any, that it
obtained through its violation. It might also require incarceration or punitive
damages. International claims litigation can sometimes be justified by reference
to retributive policies, but punishment by incarceration, for example, is chiefly
the objective of international criminal tribunals, not IMCCs. Moreover, punitive
damages are generally not awarded in international compensation cases.4 6
Retribution is therefore at most a secondary objective of IMCCs.
3. Deterrence
A third possible objective is deterrence. General deterrence entails
discouraging future actors that may be contemplating similar violations by
setting an example of the negative consequences. Typically, this would be
accomplished by requiring the perpetrator to pay for the damage caused to the
victim. Deterrence is further enhanced by the perpetrator's burden of defending
against the accusation. Finally, upon the rendering of an unfavorable award, the
perpetrator bears the cost of public exposure as a violator of international law
(so-called "naming and shaming"). Indeed, in some cases a declaration of
violation has been declared a sufficient award in and of itself.47
Both deterrence and retribution often coincide with compensation. Like
compensation, deterrence and retribution interests are implicated only in
response to a wrongful act. The act of paying the claimant's damages
(compensation) is simultaneously also an act of retribution and deterrence.
Whether attempts at deterrence are effective is debatable. Deterrence
requires that potential perpetrators be fairly certain that the threatened
consequences will materialize and that they have a deep enough aversion to the
threatened penalty that they will be willing to alter their behavior. But regardless
46. See Wittich, supra note 44, ¶ 44 (noting that because "in international law damages are
purely compensatory . .. punitive damages are generally rejected").
47. For example, see the EECC Final Award on Eritrea's Diplomatic Claim, recognizing
apology as an adequate remedy for violations of diplomatic protection. Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n, Final
Award-Eritrea's Damages Claims, XXVI R.I.A.A. 505, 509, 619-20 (Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Final
Award of Eritrea's Damages Claims] (finding that "satisfaction ... in the form of a declaration of
wrongfulness" was sufficient). See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 569-71, 575-77 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing other cases in which international
tribunals have found declaratory judgments to be sufficient remedies).
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of empirical doubts about the likelihood of successful deterrence, enough
observers believe in the efficacy of deterrence to make it a frequently cited
reason for supporting the creation of IMCCs. 4 8
4. Closure
The fourth category of objectives is closure. Closure involves laying the
dispute to rest and coming to a final determination that can be taken as
authoritative. The announcement of an authoritative determination changes the
international status quo in important ways, even when the decision calls for no
remedy. A State's ability to marshal international support for its claims is vastly
reinforced by a favorable decision and is severely undercut by an unfavorable
one. One does not have to be a nalve idealist, optimistic that States will always
step in line immediately and fulfill their adjudicated responsibilities, to see the
announcement of an arbitral or court award as affecting a State's chances at
getting what it wants. Putting legal claims to rest through adjudication is one step
towards the fulfillment of valid claims and one step towards reestablishing
international peace.
The significance of closure is often underestimated. Without assurances
that the matter will be conclusively determined, accused perpetrators will have
less reason to agree to set up a commission in the first place. Closure is
particularly important to a State facing duplicative litigation in other fora, such
as in a domestic court that happens to have concurrent jurisdiction. Often, the
agreement that establishes the IMCC specifically provides that the IMCC shall
be the exclusive forum for litigating the liability at issue, and claims not filed by
the deadline set out in the agreement will be extinguished.49 Closure, in this way,
is automatic.
As thus conceived, closure means that an authoritative determination has
been made regarding the legal sufficiency of a claim of specific unlawful conduct
for which the individual victim requests compensation. In the context of IMCCs,
however, closure also has a second meaning. With IMCCs, the alleged unlawful
conduct typically took place in the context of some broader conflict, such as a
war or an invasion. For complete closure, this broader conflict must also be put
to rest.
The tribunal does not necessarily put that broader conflict to rest by
48. See, e.g., MURPHY, KIDANE & SNIDER, supra note 24, at 403; Tiffani Y. Lee, Environmental
Liability Provisions Under the U.N. Compensation Commission: Remarkable Achievement with Room for
Improved Deterrence, 11 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 209, 216 (1998) (discussing successes of the UNCC
and proposing recommendations for increased deterrence on environmental damage claims); see also M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 294 (2010)
(discussing the goal of prevention through deterrence in international criminal justice).
49. For example, the Algiers Agreement establishing the EECC made the Commission's
jurisdiction exclusive. Algiers II, supra note 12, art. 5(8). Similarly, Article VII(2) of the IUSCT's Claims
Settlement Declaration also provides for the Tribunal's exclusivity. See IUSCT Claims Settlement
Declaration, supra note 16. However, not all claims commissions require exclusivity, and some instead
allow for dual prosecution of claims. Paragraph 22 of the U.N. Secretary-General's report regarding the
UNCC, for example, reaffirmed that "Resolution 687 (1991) could not, and does not, establish the
Commission as an organ with exclusive competence to consider claims arising from Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait." U.N. Secretary-General Report on UNCC, supra note 8, 122.
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adjudicating the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the events that gave rise to the
conflicts in the first place. These events may not even be within the tribunal's
jurisdiction. But because the continued existence of legal claims for damages
may be expected to interfere with the renewal of peaceful relations, the practical
longer-range consequence of litigating (and foreclosing) the individual claims
may be to facilitate closure of that wider issue. We might call closure of the
individual claims "formal," because it gives rise to actual legal preclusive effect.
Closure of the larger issue as a consequence of resolving all the individual claims
is, however, more "informal."
Resolving these individual claims through establishment of an IMCC
allows the parties to move beyond their prior dispute and achieve genuine closure
to their larger conflict. Indeed, by "kicking the can down the road"-postponing
resolution of the mass claims for several years until the litigation is complete-
the agreement to establish an IMCC has the potential to encourage immediate
improvement of relations, even prior to the rendering of a final award by the
IMCC. The establishment of the tribunal with the authority to render final and
binding awards delays the particularistic compensation that individuals hope to
get as remedies for their injuries, but it "locks in" the institutional solution that
promises such compensation eventually. The larger conflict can begin to heal
even though the individual claims are waiting for their individual determinations.
Closure is in some respects quite different from compensation, retribution,
and deterrence. Those three interests are focused on providing an award for the
claimant; they function as reasons that the defendant should bear the costs of an
injury that the defendant caused. These interests are not satisfied unless the claim
is accepted and the award is actually paid. A tribunal fails to meet its mandate if
it wrongly decides that recovery is not appropriate-in such a case, the interests
in compensation, retribution, and deterrence are all frustrated.
Closure, it stands to reason, is somewhat different. First, an award of
compensation to a claimant provides closure, but an award for the defendant also
provides closure and is at least as valuable. Indeed, an award for the defendant-
whether erroneous or correct-may be more valuable than an award for the
claimant, because it precludes the need for litigation about the damages. If
closure is all that matters, the best possible result would be a denial of claims-
meritorious or not-at the earliest possible point.
This holds true even if the result of the claim is to erroneously deny
recovery. The purpose of closure is to resolve the dispute without regard for the
correctness of the result. Put differently, the determination is final regardless of
whether or not it is correct, as the entire purpose of closure is to terminate future
legal inquiry into the correctness of the result. Calling a decision authoritative
means that the matter is closed to second guessing about whether the tribunal's
decision was right or wrong.
Second, the interest in closure is furthered to some degree even if an award
is not paid. A damages award for the claimant provides closure of the underlying
dispute; the claimant is vindicated when a claims commission "sets the historical
record straight" through a finding of unlawful conduct. And, further inquiry into
the merits is not permitted.
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Third, closure does not depend on whether a claim has actually been filed
and litigated on the merits. Typically, the arbitration agreement that establishes
the IMCC provides that closure is automatic, simply by operation of law. Failure
to file a claim results in closure.
Closure is therefore different from the other interests that IMCCs further.
Closure competes with compensation because it terminates even valid claims to
a damages remedy. The community's interests in deterrence and retribution
generally coincide with the claimants' interest in compensation; it is only closure
that threatens to point in a different direction. Closure is thus in tension with the
other interests.
C. For Whose Benefit? The Interested Actors
Of these four types of functions, only one (compensation) is fully private,
in the sense that it works to the benefit of the individual victim. Retribution,
deterrence, and closure provide greater benefits to the international community.
This distinction is central to the public function of IMCCs. It accounts for why
the world community is likely to support them and what their responsibilities to
the public are.
1. Parties and Individual Claimants: The Intended Beneficiaries
Certain generalizations about IMCCs can be made based on the general
principles of international law that make them possible. For example, the fact
that IMCCs are established by State consent indicates that States agree to IMCCs
hoping to better their positions. Similarly, because in a symmetric proceeding
(one where both sides are allowed to bring claims against the other) a State can
appear as either a claimant or a defendant, the disadvantage that a State gets from
more demanding rules (e.g., a higher burden of proof) is likely to be offset by
the rule's advantages. Of course, these are only generalizations, which may or
may not be true in particular cases. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the
interests of the various intended beneficiaries of IMCCs to determine, generally
speaking, which interests IMCCs tend to favor.
The international system is inhabited by actors of different kinds:
individuals, States, international governmental organizations, international non-
governmental organizations (both not-for-profit and for-profit), and potentially
a long list of others.50 The parties to proceedings before an IMCC-those whose
50. Until the last half of the twentieth century, it was generally understood that only States could
be claimants under international law; individuals and organizations had to be represented by the State of
which they were nationals. See Rainer Grote, Westphalian System, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (June 2006), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/978019
9231690/law-9780199231690-e1500, for a general discussion of actors in the international system. For a
more in-depth discussion of parties, see BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 106-25.
Depending on your belief set, you might grant a place in international society to all ethnic or linguistic
groups or to all indigenous groups, to all endangered species, or to the maritime environment. See, e.g.,
MONICA TENNBERG, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AS INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS: A SUMMARY 264-70
(2010) (discussing the potential of indigenous groups to be international actors); Fiona B. Adamson &
Madeleine Demetriou, Remapping the Boundaries of "State" and "National Identity": Incorporating
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direct legal interests are implicated-will ordinarily be either States or private
individuals, including corporations or non-governmental organizations. Their
interests depend on the capacity in which they appear in a particular proceeding.
There are two issues of capacity. The first issue is whether they act on their own
behalf or in a representative capacity. The second is whether they appear as a
claimant (victim) or as a defendant (perpetrator).
State parties often appear on their own behalf, for example, where a State
claims that the defendant's invading army destroyed public property such as
schools or hospitals.51 They may also represent the interests of their nationals
through the doctrine of diplomatic representation, or espousal.52 Whether
individuals can technically be parties depends on the way that a particular IMCC
is set up. Sometimes, individual claimants are empowered to bring claims to the
tribunal directly; otherwise, diplomatic representation is the individual victims'
only recourse.
Thus, both States and individuals may, depending on the commission
agreement, be able to appear as victims. Typically, however, only States can be
named as defendants. 53 The consequence is that individuals' interests tend to be
on the side of claimants generally-they are all claiming to be victims of
unlawful conduct-while States have interests on both sides.
Because individuals can act only as claimants, they are generally
advantaged by enhancements to the tribunal's power. Claimants are by definition
dissatisfied with the status quo and seek to upset it by obtaining an order
requiring compensation. To actomplish this, the tribunal must have the authority
to act.
Rules that restrict the power of the tribunal, in contrast, generally are to the
advantage of defendants. Because States act as both claimants and defendants,
they are more likely to be neutral between rules that enhance or limit tribunal
authority.
2. Non-Parties: The Incidental Beneficiaries
States that are not parties to any of the legal claims presented may still have
indirect interests in the dispute. Their interests may stem from proximity
Diasporas into IR Theorizing, 13 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 489 (2007) (discussing the role of diasporas in
international relations).
51. Individuals are not ordinarily subjects of international law. See, e.g., THOMAS ERSKINE
HOLLAND, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 53 (1933) ("The exclusive business of International Law
is to define the Rights and Duties of each State with reference to the rest.").
52. State espousal, or diplomatic protection, allows States to file claims for reparations on behalf
oftheir nationals. BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 10, 36-37 (2011); see also Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v.
Gr. Brit.), Judgment, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30) ("[I]t is an elementary principle of
international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction
through the ordinary channels.").
53. Nevertheless, individuals would have indirect interests as nationals of a State defending
legal claims. Hypothetically, if a State were held responsible and compelled to pay an award, that State
might raise taxes or reduce social services in order to pay the award, and thereby could adversely affect
the economic situation of its own nationals.
2892018]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
("spillover interests"), being in a situation similar to that of one of the parties
("precedential interests"), or simply membership in the international community
("universal interests").
Spillover interests should be expected. The objective of States suffering
from spillover effects is likely to be closure of the broad underlying conflict.
Non-parties may desire nothing more than a cessation of the hostilities. For
example, neighboring States may have interests in bringing an end to the conflict
because continuation threatens to cause increased refugee flows or the spread of
ethnic or sectarian tension across borders. If the conflict threatens an
international waterway, in particular a strategically important strait, this may
have implications for States that are located in the region or depend on the strait
for strategic or commercial transport. If one of the States directly involved in the
conflict holds a near-monopoly on important natural resources, the spillover
effects can be widespread and economically devastating.
Non-party States with precedential interests, however, are more likely to
support the objective of deterrence. Deterrence discourages similar bad conduct
by other actors in the future, and non-party States in positions similar to those of
the current party litigants may tend to support deterrent actions if they envision
themselves as potential victims.
Finally, States as well as other international actors throughout the entire
community potentially have a universal interest in commonly held values. For
this reason, they generally favor solutions to international problems that promote
peace, development, human rights, and friendly relations. Closure is important
to such international actors because conflict threatens human well-being. For
example, unless brought to a close, a war may exacerbate food insecurity or the
spread of infectious diseases. And it is at least arguable that all States have an
interest in the enforcement of international law, including through support for
international tribunals. Universal interests may be amorphous or diffuse, but this
does not mean that they are not influential.
International non-governmental organizations are one important category
of actors with universal interests that have as their objectives the promotion of
ideals such as international human rights, development, democracy, transitional
justice, and protection of the natural or cultural environment. By their own
organizing principles, they take an interest in the furtherance of certain values in
the international setting. While scholars may debate whether States have interests
in such principles-a thorny philosophical issue-these organizations would
have no reason for being if such interests were not generally recognized.
Depending on which values supply their organizing principles, such
organizations might have an interest in promoting institutions that seek to
provide compensation for the violation of international law.
This list is illustrative and not intended to be exhaustive. Interests in the
formation of, and support for, IMCCs are extensive and varied. Generally
speaking, almost all of the important actors in the international legal system have
good reasons to expect substantial benefits from the availability of international
mass claims tribunals. We should not be surprised if such actors lobby, pressure,
and build coalitions in support of international adjudicative institutions,
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including IMCCs. It is in their interest to do so.
3. Private versus Public Interests
It might seem at first that the existence of public interests would necessarily
increase support for IMCCs. The group of individual victims (holders of private
interests) is a small subset of the world community as a whole. Because there are
more interested actors involved once public interests are taken into account, the
amount of support for adjudicative solutions might be thought to be
correspondingly enlarged. The logic of collective action, however, shows why
increasing the size of the pool of potential supporters for IMCCs does not
necessarily make them stronger.5 4 Economic theory suggests that the so-called
"free-rider problem" will arise under certain conditions that are often
encountered in international affairs.55
This problem occurs because some or all of the actors in the system may
assume that, if they do nothing, others will take up the burden of supporting the
interest that they share. If so, they recognize that they will be able to get its
benefits while contributing nothing. In such cases, some or all will abstain from
producing the good, even though, paradoxically, all would benefit if it were
produced.5 6 Certain conditions must be met for the problem to arise, 5  but it is
54. The free-rider problem is an economic theory, which explains why some actors benefit from
goods they do not pay for because they rely on other interested actors to bear the costs. See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1971); Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1, 12-13 (1986). For a
discussion of free riding in international climate agreements, see Ana Espinola-Arredondo & F6lix
Mufloz-Garcia, Free-Riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-
Enforceable Treaties, 23 J. THEORETICAL POL. 111 (2011).
55. If States are excluded from enjoying a certain good, they have an incentive to work towards
providing the good to ensure their own access. See Robert Albanese & David D. van Fleet, Rational
Behavior in Groups: The Free-Riding Tendency, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 244 (1985); Wolfgang Stroebe
& Bruno S. Frey, Self-Interest and Collective Action: The Economics and Psychology of Public Goods,
21 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 121 (1982).
56. This problem does not occur when there is a practical method for forcing the free riders to
pay their share. States cannot be "free" riders if they are forced to pay to access public goods. See, e.g.,
ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 74 (1987) ("[C]ollective
goods tend to be underprovided unless the interests of some actor cause it to assume a disproportionate
share of the costs or some agency (e.g., government) exists that can force consumers to pay for the good.");
Ben O'Neill, Solving the "Problem" of Free Riding, MISES INST. (Nov. 13, 2007), https://mises.org/
library/solving-problem-free-riding.
57. Even a public good will not generate free-rider problems if there is, for example, a tax
system in effect that compels the financial support of the general population. Moreover, the benefits and
costs must satisfy certain arithmetical relations; if the distribution of a good is unequal, it is possible that
one actor will find it in his interest to produce the good, even if this encourages free riding by others. The
free-rider problem can moreover be dealt with if there is a single actor (generally assumed to be a large
actor) in the system that can produce the good at a cost lower than the benefit it will receive. If this
requirement is satisfied, then that large actor may produce the good even though others can take advantage
of its efforts without any concomitant effort of their own. It would not be rational to abstain from
production simply to spite the lazy free-loaders. Ian Clark has shown that these conditions may be satisfied
if a single hegemon dominates the system, such that it captures enough benefit to warrant the costs of
production:
The hegemon plays the leading role in establishing an institutional environment which is
favourable to its own interests (free trade, informal empire) but also accepts costs in being the
mainstay of the system (providing financial services, a source of capital, and a pattern of
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commonplace in the international relations literature for free riding to be
considered a serious impediment to collective action in international affairs.58 It
therefore cannot be assumed that simply increasing the number and variety of
interests furthered will make the task of finding support for IMCCs easier.
A problem more specific to the present situation occurs when the public
interests that would be advanced are not entirely compatible with the private
compensatory purposes that the IMCC was created to serve. Here, the private
interest in compensation is potentially in tension with the public interest in
closure-namely, putting a definitive end to conflict, especially conflict
involving use of force. 5 9
Compensation is obviously a central reason for having claims commissions
in the first place, and closure is a key reason for the international community to
support them. However, the tension between the two interests arises because
compensation is a function of the merits of the claim, while closure is indifferent
to which claim is meritorious. Streamlining decision-making promotes closure
but threatens the quality of justice awarded. For example, heavy reliance on
evidentiary presumptions provides a quick resolution but comes at the expense
of accuracy. Additionally, it may promote closure to impose a compromise
solution, or to impose a solution that favors the stronger party or the one that is
favored by the status quo. However, in all of these situations, the desire to
achieve closure threatens to compromise the merits.
There is reason for concern that the States not party to a dispute may value
closure at the expense of compensation for meritorious claims. In the mass
claims context, it is no easy feat to determine accurately the compensation
needed by each claimant and to deliver it to the right person. The costs of such
an undertaking are substantial, and the guarantees of accurate accomplishment
are minimal.6 0 Without some sort of monitoring system-a costly undertaking
for which the tribunal is unlikely to be well equipped-it may not be possible to
military support). According to this conception, the hegemon is the main beneficiary of the
system but also the main provider of externalities to the other members: it receives
disproportionate benefits but accepts disproportionate burdens.
IAN CLARK, THE HIERARCHY OF STATES: REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 106-
07 (1989) (arguing also that public goods can be supplied in the absence of a single hegemon). For
example, security is a public good because States located in a region where security has been ensured by
a hegemon cannot be excluded from enjoying its benefits. The hegemon provides security for the region
because the hegemon "possesses a superior interest in preserving peace and stability in its environment,
and is compelled to produce the common good on its own even without the support of others." Harald
Muller, The Role ofHegemonies andAlliances, in SECURITY WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?: DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVES ON NON-NUCLEAR SECURITY 226, 228 (Regina Cowen Karp ed., 1992) (citation omitted).
The same logic is at work to explain production of the good when a former hegemon still captures more
than its pro rata share of the benefit.
58. See, e.g., Stephen R. Gill & David Law, Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of
Capital, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 475, 492 (1989) (noting that the free-rider temptation is reduced when dealing
with a smaller number of States).
59. Closure and compensation are the two interests most likely to come in conflict. For reasons
already given, retribution and deterrence are not generally important in mass claims cases. See supra
Section I.B; infra Part II.
60. See BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 191, for a further discussion
of the challenges in accurately calculating damages.
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confirm whether the award moneys are distributed to the right parties, or
distributed at all.
D. IMCCs as Semi-Public Institutions
Where public and private interests are incompatible, what should be done?
An answer may be sought in general principles about rational behavior in
circumstances where no central government with reliable centralized
enforcement power can be found. The IMCC's mandate is to adjudicate the
individual- and State-owned claims of the victims concerning international law
violations. An IMCC owes its existence, obviously, to the parties that created
it-whether the parties did so with enthusiasm or reluctance.61 But the parties'
willingness to comply might not be enough. In some situations, the support of
the international community becomes important. It is risky for the parties to
simply ignore the public interest when public support may turn out to be crucial.
In the long run, the IMCC's ability to carry out its mandate may depend on
whether it has public support.
States at war may sometimes find it difficult to reach agreement because
diplomatic communications have broken down. In such cases, neighboring
States or major powers from outside the region might be asked to step in to
facilitate negotiations. Precisely what might be done depends on particular
circumstances, but one can generalize about some possibilities. If the parties find
themselves at a political impasse, diplomats from other States may assist by
floating proposals or by drafting language acceptable to both sides. Third-party
States may offer financial support for the typically very expensive process of
investigating and litigating claims. Technical expertise may be needed, which
can be provided by cartographers, oceanographers, or military specialists from
non-party States or international organizations. Former colonial powers
sometimes provide assistance in locating evidence (e.g., historical documents
archived in their colonial libraries).
Powerful non-party States that take an interest in the resolution of a dispute
also can play an important role in holding both parties to the process. Over the
course of the proceedings, one party or the other may become discouraged about
the likelihood of success and try to find a way out of the process. This is easier
to do if there is no other State with an interest in the proceedings that can create
a sense of urgency for the reluctant party. And of course, once the process is
complete, third-party support may be essential in inducing the parties to comply
with the awards. If nothing else, third-party expressions of approval for the
process or the results encourage general acceptance of an IMCC's exercise of its
authority.
It should be expected that ad hoc tribunals such as IMCCs would likely
need to marshal more international support than standing international tribunals.
61. While some commissions are set up through direct consent between the States involved,
such as the EECC, consent to a claims commission may be less explicit. For example, the UNCC was
created by a resolution of the U.N. Security Council in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. S.C.
Res. 687, supra note 16.
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Several factors may explain this difference. First, non-party States may already
be committed to assisting the work of a particular standing tribunal. Standing
tribunals exist independently of a particular adjudication, and there will be non-
party States that are committed to that standing tribunal through preexisting
treaty. Second, standing tribunals presumably already have a reliable source of
funding; financial support for judges' salaries, physical infrastructure, day-to-
day expenses, et cetera, will have been arranged at an earlier point.
Third, standing tribunals already have credibility. Their track record of
decided cases makes them a known and accepted quantity. In particular, the
judges on a standing court will have been chosen for their reputation in the
community at large and will probably already enjoy community confidence.
Most of the commissioners on an ad hoc tribunal will have been party-appointed
and therefore assumed not to be entirely neutral. Especially if this is their first
quasi-judicial appointment, they are unlikely to be as well known to the
community as a full-time sitting judge. As a general matter, a standing tribunal
is less likely to be suspected of bias or political motivation; it was established,
and its judges and procedures were selected, prior to the submission of a
particular dispute to the tribunal.
Finally, when a case is brought before a standing court, States will be aware
that the day may come when they will need that court in a case of their own. It
does not pay, for example, to refuse evidentiary assistance to a court before
which one might have to appear. A State that contemplates bringing a case before
a particular standing court some day is less likely to denigrate the authority of a
court's award. Standing courts, for all of these reasons, are better positioned to
expect the assistance of the international community. Ad hoc tribunals have to
earn the community's confidence.
The likelihood of third-party support is important to IMCCs because of the
role that the international community plays in ensuring recognition of, and
respect for, international law. Anything that adds to the benefits that IMCCs are
capable of producing potentially increases the community's support. It is a
truism that without a centralized government, the task of encouraging respect for
international law and legal institutions falls to the States themselves and to the
individuals in the international community that have interests in international
affairs. Anything that increases community support for IMCCs would seem to
further an IMCC's chances of successfully completing its mandate.
It is difficult to generalize about the proper course of action when private
and public interests conflict. IMCCs distinctively combine public and private
functions. As ad hoc bodies, IMCCs seem to come out of nowhere, pulling
themselves up by their bootstraps and eventually disbanding their own
operations, on their own initiative, when they determine that their mandate (as
defined by the agreement that created them) has been carried out. With no
institutional past and only a limited future, the immediate loyalties of ad hoc
tribunals are to the parties that created them.
Yet large and long-standing claims commissions, dealing with major issues
of public international law, can cast as long a shadow as some standing
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international courts.6 2 Although an IMCC's first responsibility is to its mandate,
IMCCs may be unable to carry out their mandate if they cannot attract and then
retain public support. IMCCs do not act in isolation. Their first resource will
probably be the parties-whether the need concerns financial support,
recognition of their authority, or technical expertise. However, when the parties
are unwilling or unable to assist, the international community may step in with
money, expertise, or assistance in enforcing judgments. Thus, IMCCs are semi-
public institutions.
II. CLOSURE VERSUS COMPENSATION: THREE IMCCS COMPARED
Tensions between the various interests in IMCC adjudication is illustrated
by the disparate outcomes of three modern international claims tribunals: the
IUSCT, the UNCC, and the EECC. These three commissions were not all equally
successful in accomplishing the purposes for which they were ostensibly created.
The IUSCT is only now completing its work, almost forty years after it
commenced operation. Over its tenure, the IUSCT has delivered $2.5 billion-
worth of awards, almost all of which have been paid.63 The UNCC finished its
work and closed its doors in 2005; its awards totaled around $50 billion, almost
all of which has been paid.64 Lastly, the EECC finished its work and disbanded
in 2009, with its awards totaling around $350 million, none of which has ever
been paid.65
Why did the claimants at the UNCC and IUSCT end up with compensation
while the claimants at the EECC did not? The explanation for this difference is
suggested by the way that the initial agreements were framed. The first two
agreements were written in a way that made it clear that individual compensation
was the object, while the text of the third agreement suggests the opposite. The
contours of the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace agreement suggest that the dominant
interest underlying formation of the EECC was not compensation but closure.
None of this can be appreciated without an understanding of the background of
the three IMCCs.
A. Background
The background of each conflict that gave rise to the claims constitutes an
essential element of any explanation for the differences in outcome between the
three IMCCs. The first of these commissions, chronologically, was the IUSCT.
It traces its genesis to the events of the early 1980s.
62. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
63. The U.S. Department of State provides a helpful overview of the IUSCT. Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, supra note 7.
64. The UNCC has awarded a total of $52.4 billion in compensation to approximately 1.5
million successful claimants. U.N. COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 9.
65. The EECC awards amount to about $161 million to the Eritrean government, about $2
million to individual Eritreans, and $174 million to the Ethiopian government. See Final Award of
Eritrea's Damages Claims, supra note 47, at 629-30, 768-70; Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n, Final Award-
Ethiopia's Damages Claims, XXVI R.I.A.A. 631, 758-70 (Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Final Award of
Ethiopia's Damages Claims].
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1. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
The IUSCT arose out of the conflict between Iran and the United States
following the Iranian revolution in 1979. The United States had supported the
previous ruler, the Shah of Iran. With the ousting of the Shah and the
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. nationals found the
atmosphere in Iran increasingly poisonous. When the new revolutionary
government commenced a program of nationalizing the banking, insurance, and
oil sectors of its economy, around 45,000 Americans who had been living in Iran
fled, many leaving considerable property behind.66
On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian militants seized the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran and detained a number of diplomats and consular officers. It
was clear that they were aligned with and supported by the new Iranian
government. The United States froze Iranian assets located in the United States
in retaliation, but by the fall of 1980, the hostages still had not been released.67
The situation of the hostages in the embassy was of considerable concern
in the United States, which was then in the throes of a presidential election.68 As
the United States had severed diplomatic ties, the two States could not negotiate
directly and instead relied on Algeria as an intermediary in the negotiations. The
agreements that became known as the Algiers Accords (not to be confused with
the Algiers Agreements forming the EECC69 ) were signed in January 1981,
thereby creating the IUSCT.70
The IUSCT still operates in The Hague. It has nine judges: three from the
United States, three from Iran, and three from other States. It is authorized to
hear the private claims of U.S. nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals
against the United States arising out of debts, contracts, expropriations, or other
measures that affect property rights. The Claims Settlement Declaration of the
Algiers Accords states that the "Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of
respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial
66. See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL 1-2 (1998).
67. Id. at 4-6.
68. For an account of the effect that the hostage crisis had on the U.S. presidential election, see
Office of the Historian, The Iranian Hostage Crisis, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/
departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises (last visited Apr. 20, 2018):
While the courage of the American hostages in Tehran and of their families at home reflected
the best tradition of the Department of State, the Iran hostage crisis undermined Carter's
conduct of foreign policy. The crisis dominated the headlines and news broadcasts and made
the Administration look weak and ineffectual. Although patient diplomacy conducted by
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher eventually resolved the crisis, Carter's foreign policy
team often seemed weak and vacillating.
69. See infra Section II.A.3.
70. The Algiers Accords consist of two separate declarations, known as the General Declaration
and the Claims Settlement Declaration. The General Declaration addressed the liberation of the U.S.
hostages, the transfer of some frozen assets back to Iran, and the termination of litigation in the U.S. courts
in favor of arbitration. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981), 1 Iran-U.S. CTR 3 (1983) [hereinafter IUSCT General Declaration].
The Claims Settlement Declaration established the IUSCT. See IUSCT Claims Settlement Declaration,
supra note 16.
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and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into
account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances." 7'
Claims under $250,000 are defined as small claims. About 2,800 small
claims were filed-the great majority by U.S. nationals-and were settled by a
lump sum payment of $105 million to the United States.72 About one thousand
large claims were filed and decided by 2003. These were filed by the claimants
individually and not by the United States on the claimants' behalf.7 3
The IUSCT also has jurisdiction over official claims between Iran and the
United States based on contractual arrangements for the purchase and sale of
goods and services. Washington has filed twenty-four cases and Tehran has filed
fifty-three. Seventy-two of these have been resolved, and the remainder await
resolution. Overall, the IUSCT has awarded more than $2.5 billion to U.S.
nationals and companies.74 The IUSCT has successfully resolved over 3,900
claims and continues to this day to carry out its mandate.7
2. The UnitedNations Compensation Commission
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and shortly thereafter announced
Kuwait's annexation. The human losses of the invasion and the occupation that
followed were considerable: thousands of civilians were killed or injured, and
hundreds of thousands of foreign workers were forced to flee. The invasion and
occupation also caused tremendous property damage; much of it was deliberate,
including the setting on fire of more than six hundred oil wells. A U.N.-
sanctioned military coalition ousted the Iraqi army from Kuwait in January and
February 1991. The United Nations thereupon created a compensation
commission to process claims for the losses brought about by Iraq's invasion.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 provided the terms for the
Commission's creation. In that Resolution, Iraq was declared to be "liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage-including environmental damage
and the depletion of natural resources-or injury to foreign Governments,
nationals and corporations."7 The UNCC's jurisdiction included claims of
individuals who were forced to leave Iraq or Kuwait as a result of the invasion,
71. IUSCT Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 16, art. 5.
72. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ofthe US., Completed Programs: Iran, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/fcsc/completed-programs-iran (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
73. Amsterdam Int'l L. Clinic, Monetary Payments for Civilian Harm in International and
National Practice, CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT 37 (citing United States of America, on behalf of
U.S. Nationals v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos. 86, B38, B76 & B77, Award on Agreed Terms for
Claims of Less Than $250,000 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 22, 1990)); see also BROWER & BRUESCHKE,
supra note 66, at 116-18.
74. In addition to the $2.5 billion awarded to U.S. claimants, the IUSCT has awarded $1 billion
to Iranian claimants. John Bellinger, U.S. Settlement of Iran Claims Tribunal Claim Was Prudent but
Possible Linkage to Release of Americans Is Regrettable, LAWFARE (Jan. 18, 2016 11:53 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/us-settlement-iran-claims-tribunal-claim-was-prudent-possible-linkage-
release-americans-regrettable.
75. See About the Tribunal, supra note 7.
76. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 16.
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as well as individual claims for serious personal injury, death, or other damages.
The drafters streamlined the claims process as much as possible in order to
deal with the unusually challenging circumstances. Iraq was not permitted to
submit claims of its own; it figured solely as a defendant, thus eliminating one
potentially time-consuming set of issues. Resolution 687 avoided litigation of
certain other legal issues by explicitly declaring Iraq liable. Additionally, many
of the basic factual assumptions that the claimant would ordinarily need to prove
were declared to be provable by presumption, thus obviating the need for detailed
evidentiary showings in tens of thousands of smaller claims." The proceedings
in this way took on something of an administrative, rather than a purely
adjudicative, character. Iraq's consent to the formation of the Commission, with
its unusual procedural features, was a condition of ending the allied military
coalition's march on Baghdad.
Unsurprisingly, Iraq denounced the UNCC repeatedly.78 It became more
cooperative after a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq in the Second Persian Gulf
War and deposed Saddam Hussein. By the time the Commission finished taking
claims, about 2.7 million claims had been submitted, totaling more than $350
billion. 79 Between 1991 and 2005, the UNCC awarded more than $50 billion to
1.5 million successful claimants.o So far, $47.8 billion in compensation has been
paid."
3. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
The EECC was created by the second Algiers Agreement ("Algiers II") of
December 12, 2000.82 A comprehensive peace treaty, Algiers II followed a
separate June 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, also signed in Algiers
77. Article 35 of the UNCC's Rules concerned evidence. Article 35(2) discussed the minimum
standards of evidence required. For payment of fixed amounts in departure cases, claimants only needed
to provide "simple documentation of the fact and date of departure from Iraq or Kuwait. Documentation
of the actual amount of loss [was] not required." For claims below $100,000, claims needed to "be
documented by appropriate evidence of the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss." However, the
UNCC noted that "[d]ocuments and other evidence required will be the reasonable minimum that is
appropriate under the particular circumstances of the case." Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, as
Adopted by Decision of the Governing Council of the U.N. Compensation Commission Taken at the 27th
Meeting, art. 35, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10 (June 26, 1992), http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/
11176/55079/SAC.26_1992_Inf. 1-EN.pdf?sequence= l&isAllowed=y.
78. See Michael E. Schneider, The Role oflraq in the UNCC Process with Special Emphasis on
the Environmental Claims, in WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION:
DESIGNING COMPENSATION AFTER CONFLICT, supra note 7, at 135.
79. See U.N. COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 9. The UNCC website maintains a
record of awards. See Decisions of the Governing Council, U.N. COMPENSATION COMMISSION,
https://www.uncc.ch/decisions-governing-council (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
80. For an overview of the UNCC, see WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION
COMMISSION: DESIGNING COMPENSATION AFTER CONFLICT, supra note 7; Bederman, supra note 7;
Feighery, supra note 7.
81. The remaining unpaid amount of $4.6 billion pertains to a single claim awarded to Kuwait
for the production and revenue losses resulting from damages to Kuwait's oilfield assets. UN Panel Pays
Out Over $1 Billion in Reparations for Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, U.N. NEWS SERV. (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID-49150#.WXn5jYiGM2w.
82. Algiers II, supra note 12.
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("Algiers I"). Algiers I had put an end to Ethiopia and Eritrea's bloody two-year
border war. 8 3 Paragraph 12 of Algiers I contained a provision for a temporary
security zone to be patrolled by a U.N. peacekeeping mission (UNMEE). Article
3 of Algiers 11 directed the creation of an Organization of African Unity (OAU)
body to determine the causes of the conflict, and Article 4 established the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to determine the proper permanent
location of the boundary.
A claims commission, the EECC, was created by Article 5 of Algiers II.
Article 5 empowered the EECC to decide "through binding arbitration all claims
for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals
(including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against the
Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party"
that were related to the conflict and resulted "from violations of international
humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations
of international law." 84
The EECC was established under the auspices of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA), which served as its registry, maintained the Commission's
files, and managed communications between the Commission and the parties.
Under Algiers II, claims had to be filed by December 12, 2001, one year after
the signing of the Agreement. The EECC issued its first decisions on jurisdiction
and procedure in 2001, several partial awards on the merits from 2003 to 2005,
and final awards on damages in August 2009. In its partial awards, the EECC
dealt with a variety of issues, including the treatment of prisoners of war;
internees and civilians; the legality of certain means and methods of warfare; the
treatment of diplomatic premises and personnel; and the looting, seizure, and
unlawful destruction of private property.
Algiers II instructed the EECC to attempt to finalize proceedings within
three years after the claims-filing period; this deadline was later extended and
the Commission did not issue its final decision until 2009. The final damage
awards ordered the payment of about $161 million to Eritrea and about $2
million to Eritrean nationals. The EECC awarded about $174 million to
Ethiopia.86 No award money was ever transferred in either direction.
When it came to resolving the legal claims of the parties, all three of these
IMCCs were as successful as could be expected, considering their circumstances.
They were competent, professional, reasonably expeditious, and decisive-and
the awards that they issued went largely unchallenged by the parties. In this
regard, the resolution of legal claims counts as a reason to be optimistic about
IMCCs' future success. When it came to the actual payment of damages to
injured individuals, however, the record is less clear. The IUSCT and the UNCC
were able to compensate the injured individuals. But the EECC was not. Clues
83. Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.-Eri., June 18, 2000, 2138 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Algiers 1].
84. Algiers II, supra note 12, art. 5.12.
85. See Case View: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 9.
86. See Final Award of Ethiopia's Damages Claims, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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about the reasons why can be found in the text of the three arbitration agreements
that created the IMCCs.
B. Relevant Treaty Diferences: Thick and Thin IMCCs
The relevant differences between the three commissions are all tied to the
various ways that the parties and the international community prioritized their
specific interests. Their expectations, and apparently their objectives, were
different. Reading between the lines of the three agreements to arbitrate, it is
clear that the IUSCT and the UNCC are more like one another than either is like
the EECC. Looking at the agreements that were drafted by the parties-in some
circumstances under the influence of international facilitators-a clear pattern
emerges.
The two earlier agreements-the ones establishing the IUSCT and
UNCC-created IMCCs with the capacity to award individualized
compensation. The last of the three-the one establishing the EECC-created an
IMCC almost completely devoid of that capacity. The participants in the EECC
drafting process never seemed to expect individualized compensation. State-to-
State compensation was the only remaining alternative, under which an informal
set-off-in which only the difference between the two lump sum awards would
be payable-was the predictable outcome. It would not be reasonable to expect
individualized awards; and after a set-off, compensation for individual victims
was a near impossibility.
The pattern can be summed up in terms of the difference in "thickness" or
"thinness" of the treatment that the parties gave to various issues. The relatively
thick provision made by the IUSCT and UNCC agreements for individualized
awards indicates seriousness of purpose and thus the parties' expectations. The
extraordinarily thin provision made by the EECC agreement about the same issue
suggests the opposite.
Unlike the IUSCT and the UNCC, the EECC was not designed to require
individual payments of compensation to individuals, nor to deal with problems
of non-payment of awards.8 7 The point is not that participants in the process
intended all along that no compensation should be paid. It seems likely that, all
else being equal, they would have considered payment of compensation
desirable. Rather, the point, as will be shown below, is that it would have been
clear to the parties and to third-State observers from the outset that compensation
was unlikely to take place-and yet they decided to proceed regardless. That is,
something other than compensation seems to have motivated the establishment
of the EECC. Closure, an interest in tension with compensation, seems to have
been the motivating objective here.
1. Thickness and Thinness ofAgreements to Arbitrate
It is not just the content of the treaty that indicates what the parties have in
mind; it is also the form that the agreement takes. The extent to which an
87. See BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 212-15.
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agreement gives detailed, individualized attention to certain provisions is likely
to reflect the drafters' priorities.
Some IMMCs can be characterized as "thick" while others can only be
characterized as "thin." Thick IMCCs are robust institutions with large staff,
extensive administrative responsibilities, guaranteed sources of funding,
adequate resources to deal directly with large numbers of individual claimants,
and long-term expected existence. Their institutional presence is so secure and
longstanding that they almost approach the solidity of a standing body such as a
court. Provisions dealing with their capacities are detailed and their methods of
exercising power are spelled out. They are at one end of the spectrum.
The "thin" IMCCs are at the other end of that spectrum. Limited in staff to
hardly more than their (usually part-time) commission members, thin IMCCs
have no secure funding and must request money for costs from the parties when
they need it. They may rely on services of an external registry such as the PCA
rather than hiring their own administrative staff. The agreement that sets them in
motion may specify only a short period of time in which to finish their work,
after which they are authorized to take additional time only if necessary.
Likewise, the individual matters covered in an arbitration agreement can
be more individualized and detailed ("thick") or less ("thin"). The thickness or
thinness of a provision in the arbitration agreement serves as a proxy for the
seriousness of the parties' attention to practical planning. Where a certain matter
(e.g., the procedure for payment of awards) is dealt with in detail, with attention
to anticipated difficulties and relatively specific guidance about how to manage
future problems, it is clear that the issue is being taken seriously. If a particular
issue is never mentioned, or mentioned only in passing, this suggests that it is
not being treated as a real source of concern.
The agreements establishing the IUSCT and the UNCC were very different
from the agreement establishing the EECC in their responses to several important
questions. First, did the agreement provide the relevant commission with the
resources needed to carry out its responsibilities? "Resources" includes the
financial and other practical support required to undertake such an assignment.
It also includes the procedural structure that makes management of such an
assignment possible (e.g., procedural specifications that describe how claims
should be filed, the necessary ingredients of a claim, any evidentiary rules, et
cetera). Second, did the parties take precautionary steps to ensure payment of the
awards? The answers to these questions reveal implicit expectations of the
agreements' drafters regarding how the three commissions were likely to
perform.
2. Sufficiency ofProcess and Adequacy of Institutional Support
In terms of the process specified in the arbitration agreement and the
resources committed to the IMCC's functioning, there is simply no comparison
between the IUSCT and the UNCC, on the one hand, and the EECC, on the other.
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The IUSCT is the longest-running international commission in history.88 It
is almost a standing court, with smooth turnover, replacement of judges, and
routine publication of legal awards-a system of precedent. The Tribunal has
taken on a presence and a persona that are unique in the annals of international
arbitration.
The IUSCT received claims for one year (the deadline for filing was
January 1982)89 and the resulting docket was huge. About 2,800 small claims
were filed-the great majority by U.S. nationals-and were settled by a lump
sum payment to the United States of $105 million.90 About one-thousand large
claims were filed and decided by 2003. These were filed by the claimants
individually and not by the United States on the claimants' behalf.9 1 The IUSCT
entertained each claim individually on a full evidentiary record.92
The IUSCT began work in facilities provided by the PCA in The Hague
but later rented a permanent location from the Dutch government-two buildings
with 2,500 square feet of space-which it still occupies. 9 3 When originally
rented, the IUSCT headquarters was empty except for carpet and draperies. The
two buildings had to be fully furnished and built out to the particular
specifications of the IUSCT, including a separate prayer annex and a fully
functioning cafeteria able to prepare meals to accommodate the religious
strictures of all personnel. 94
The UNCC was also an enormous enterprise. Its administrative structure
88. This discussion of practicalities of IMCC administration is taken from Chapter 5 of
BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15. See also Caplan, supra note 8; Sharpe, supra note
26.
89. IUSCT Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 16, art. 111(4). For a further discussion,
see BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 151.
90. See Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S., Completed Programs: Iran, supra
note 72; United States of America, on behalf of U.S. Nationals v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos. 86,
B38, B76 & B77, Award on Agreed Terms for Claims of Less Than $250,000 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June
22, 1990), reprinted in 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 327 (1990).
91. See About the Tribunal, supra note 7; see also BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra
note 15, at 17.
92. Eight years later, so many small claims had accumulated that the IUSCT outsourced them
to the FCSC, a standing entity within the U.S. Department of Justice. See supra note 32. The FCSC's
loaning of its facilities and resources to the IUSCT is an excellent illustration of the support that can be
given to IMCCs by the international community. Since 1948, the IUSCT has been the conduit through
which the United States outsources its mass claims programs and has gained considerable experience in
conducting programs of this kind. Of the 3,066 claims for under $250,000 transferred to the FCSC from
the IUSCT, 1,066 awards were made totaling over $41.5 million. Claimants received actual damages to a
limit of $10,000. An additional 578 claims were withdrawn or dismissed for failure to appear, and 1,422
claims were denied. The process took five years. Final Report on the Iran Claims Program, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE 1-2, http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/08/26/final report
on the iran claims_program.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
93. Christopher Pinto, Institutional Aspects of the Tribunal, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION 95, 100 (David D. Caron
& John R. Crook eds., 2000).
94. Id at 114.
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was comprised of a Governing Council, 95 a group of commissioners, 96 and the
Secretariat. The Secretariat was headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and the
members of the Secretariat alone totaled 250 at its highest. Headed by an
executive secretary, the Secretariat supported the work of both the Governing
Council and the commissioners.
The administrative side of the EECC was as thin as the IUSCT's and
UNCC's were thick. The EECC itself had no full-time staff, no dedicated
building for office space, and no other permanent assets. The commissioners
were part time-two academics, two practicing lawyers, and one judge.97 The
EECC saved money by outsourcing its requirements to the PCA, which,
throughout the proceedings, acted as the registry. By such measures, the
Commission made the most of its meager endowment. 98
In an early procedural ruling, the EECC made provision for mass claims
filings, allowing compensation fixed by category of claim.99 The Commission
was to provide a standardized claim form for the parties to use. However, both
parties instead chose to employ a diplomatic representation model in which the
State brought claims on behalf of individual citizens.100 This approach
significantly reduced the costs of preparing and litigating the claims because the
injured parties did not have to all be named individually, nor did the specifics of
all their injuries have to be provided. In its Partial Awards on liability, the
Commission either accepted or rejected a generalized showing that some alleged
violation did occur, leaving the thorny question of how many times the violation
occurred for the second (damages) phase of the litigation. At that point, the
Commission simply made its best estimate based on the evidence that the parties
had provided.' 01
95. The Governing Council's membership was identical to that of the Security Council. It was
the principal organ responsible for the general policy and legal framework. It also reviewed and finally
approved the reports and recommendations on claims made by the commissioners.
96. The commissioners were nominated by the U.N. Secretary-General upon recommendation
of the executive secretary of the UNCC and sat in panels of three members to consider and render
recommendations on claims in specific categories.
97. Commissioners Hans van Houtte and James Paul were academics, Lucy Reed and John
Crook were practicing lawyers, and George Aldrich was ajudge. See Case View: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, supra note 9.
98. See BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 155 ("[The EECC] used the
PCA space for filings, hearings and the occasional meeting of the parties or the commissioners. The
commissioners did the bulk of their work from home offices, communicating by telephone and email and
sharing documents on a secure server that was provided by a commissioner's law firm.").
99. Decision 2 of the Commission stated:
The Commission has decided to establish a mass claims process under which claims of persons
in Categories 1-5 may be filed for fixed amount compensation. The Parties shall prepare claims
forms for all such claims, using forms to be established by the Commission. Specified data
derived from those forms may be filed with the Commission in electronic form pursuant to
guidance the Commission will provide.
Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n, Preliminary Decision No. 2, XXVI R.I.A.A. 6, 6 (Aug. 2001).
100. Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n, Preliminary Decision No. 8, XXVI R.I.A.A. 21, T 3 (July 27,
2007) (recognizing that the parties had chosen to file inter-State claims) [hereinafter EECC Preliminary
Decision No. 8].
101. The Commission noted that given the circumstances, it "made the best estimates possible
on the basis of the available evidence," and it recognized that "when obligated to determine appropriate
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Having thus reduced as much as possible the practical difficulties that
would otherwise have been encountered in adjudicating such a large number of
claims, the EECC was still hard put to complete such a large and complicated
task within its nine-year lifespan. Algiers II, astonishingly, had instructed the
Commission to endeavor to complete its work within three years. After almost
four decades of operation, the IUSCT, as noted above, has still not completed its
work, and the UNCC took around fourteen years to complete its assignment.1 0 2
The EECC, with a small fraction of the resources of these two massive
enterprises, was asked to fulfill its mandate in only three.
3. Why Procedural and Resource Sufficiency Matter
The fact that the EECC had seemingly been tasked with responsibilities far
beyond its resources is important. Considering the dearth of resources-the
parties' as well as the Commission's-it hardly seems possible that the
participants in the drafting process expected a more individualized proceeding
than what the Commission ultimately provided. Facing the same resource
problem as the Commission, the parties chose to submit their claims in
accordance with these expectations. Moreover, since the Commission was not at
the outset given the evidence of unlawful injury in individualized form, it was
impossible to give awards in an individualized form. But if the awards were
announced in lump sum format, an informal set-off was almost inevitable and
compensation to the individual claimants became, practically speaking, quite
unlikely.
The parties revealed their expectations early on, when they submitted their
claims on an inter-State, or diplomatic representation, basis.1 0 3 That is to say,
each State party submitted evidence about injury to its nationals as part of a claim
that was legally held by the State itself. This was one of the options that had been
provided by the Commission's Rules of Procedure.1 04 That claims were filed in
accordance with a diplomatic representation model rather than on an
individualized basis greatly reduced the parties' and the Commission's
administrative burden.
Under the diplomatic representation model, the injuries of individuals
compensation, it must do so even if the process involves estimation, or even guesswork, within the range
of possibilities indicated by the evidence." Final Award of Eritrea's Damages Claims, supra note 47, at
655-56; Final Award of Ethiopia's Damages Claims, supra note 65, at 528; see also MICHAEL J.
MATHESON, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL TRIBUNALS AND ARMED CONFLICT 242 (2012) ("This sense of
limitations and the need for pragmatic approaches was evident throughout the Commission's work on
damages.").
102. See supra note 9.
103. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
104. Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n, Rules of Procedure (Oct. 1, 2001). Chapter Two, in particular,
addressed the "Procedures for Individual Consideration of Claims" and provided:
This Chapter applies to all claims that are to be individually arbitrated. These claims include
all claims by the government of one party on its own behalf against the government of the
other party, all claims for compensation in excess of US$100,000 on behalf of persons, and
any other claims for which individual treatment is required by Chapter Three.
Id. art. 23. Chapter Three, titled "Mass Claims Procedures," dealt with claims for fixed amount
compensation.
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harmed during the war featured simply as evidence of a general pattern of
unlawful conduct. The tens of thousands of injured individuals thus did not have
to be identified at the outset when claims were filed. If a claim was rejected at
the liability phase, these individuals would never have to be identified. And if
the claim was accepted, then at the damages phase, the Commission could
estimate a suitable single lump sum amount in damages. The State would take
responsibility for disaggregating that lump sum and passing the proceeds along
to individual claimants.
For the Commission to handle such a large number of claims on a more
individualized basis-in the allotted time, with the limited resources that it
commanded-would have been nearly impossible as a practical matter. This
must have been appreciated when Article 5 of Algiers II was drafted. In any
event, the parties spared the Commission this burden when they also bowed to
reality and submitted their claims on an inter-State basis. The choice to entertain
claims on an inter-State basis was the only reasonable one under the
circumstances.
But the filing of cases as State-to-State rather than as individualized claims
effectively compromised the compensation interests of the individuals who were
ultimately determined to be entitled to recovery.10 Diplomatic representation
(espousal) subsumes the individual compensation interest under the interests of
the State and treats as a purely domestic matter the State's exercise of dominion
over its nationals' property (namely, his or her claims award). 1 06 Although the
decision was the only possible practical one, it had irreversible consequences for
the injured individuals' chances of receiving any recovery.
The result of the choice was that it was simply not possible for the
Commission to give individualized awards.107 To afford compensation on an
individualized basis, with awards going directly to the injured claimants, the
Commission would have had to announce awards on a person-by-person basis.108
As the claims had been submitted in aggregated form under the diplomatic
representation model, the information necessary to individualize the awards was
simply not in the record. The only possibility was, therefore, a lump sum award.
Given the inevitability of a lump sum award, the informal set-off that
eventually transpired-neither side paid anything to the other, on the grounds
105. See EECC Preliminary Decision No. 8, supra note 100, at 21, ¶ 3 ("The Commission
recognizes that the Parties chose to pursue inter-State claims, and that each Party has full authority to
determine the use and distribution of any damages awarded to it.").
106. For a discussion of some of the positive reasons why a State should be permitted to use
damages awarded to its nationals as part of a set-off, see BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra
note 15, at 202-09.
107. It is debatable, of course, whether the Commission would have taken the unusual step of
issuing an award in a form different from the one chosen by the parties when they submitted their claims.
The point here, however, is merely that this option was precluded as a practical matter, both because it
would have been difficult administratively to manage so many awards of compensation and because the
Commission could not have had the information to pursue that path.
108. Had the Commission somehow attempted to do this, the administrative burden would have
increased accordingly. In such a model that awards payment on an individualized basis, the compensating
State must be monitored because it has an incentive not to surrender the money. For a further discussion
of compliance, see BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 191-214.
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that the amounts owed were not very different-was also unavoidable. It would
have done the individual victims of wartime legal violations no good at all for
the two States to simply exchange the cash that the Commission had awarded.
Thus, the individuals who had been injured during the war went uncompensated.
Looking at the text of Article 5 of Algiers 11, it is hard to imagine that the
parties expected individualized awards; to the contrary, from the outset, when
the agreement was being drafted, it would have been clear that the project was
realistic only as a State-to-State proceeding, especially on the shoestring budget
at the Commission's disposal. The parties' subsequent individual decisions to
file claims State-to-State reflected practicalities that would have been obvious
from the beginning. It would simply not have been cost effective to file tens of
thousands of individual claims, with individual bodies of supporting evidence,
individual hearings, and so forth, considering the small size of the average claim
and the lack of access to documentary proof.
The IUSCT and the UNCC had access to enough resources-financial and
temporal-such that they could entertain the necessary number of individual
claims. They had the administrative capacity to manage the many thousands of
claims; this administrative capacity simply did not exist at the EECC. Moreover,
it was clear from the way that the Algiers Accords (establishing the IUSCT) and
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (establishing the UNCC) were drafted that
the two commissions were expected to issue awards of individualized
compensation that identified the injured parties themselves, rather than issue
awards according to a diplomatic representation model. The Claims Settlement
Declaration of the Algiers Accords states that "[c]laims of nationals of the United
States and Iran that are within the scope of this Agreement shall be presented to
the Tribunal either by claimants themselves or, in the case of claims of less than
$250,000, by the government of such national."1 09 At the UNCC, claims were
presented by the State on behalf of injured parties who were its nationals, but the
process was completed in an individualized format using a standard claim
form.110 This element was entirely absent from the agreement authorizing the
creation of the EECC.
4. Measures for Ensuring Payment: The "Judgment-Proof' State
One final difference between the EECC arbitration agreement and the
agreements setting up the IUSCT and UNCC must be mentioned. This difference
bears strongly on the question of how the individual claimants at the EECC
ended up with nothing. It concerns the provisions for ensuring payment of the
awards that the three agreements contained. The clearest difference concerning
payment of awards between the IUSCT and the UNCC, on the one hand, and the
EEC, on the other, arises directly out of the arbitration agreements' explicit
109. IUSCT Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 16, art. 111(3).
110. See U.N. Comp. Comm'n Governing Council, Decision Taken by the Governing Council of
the U.N. Compensation Commission at the 27th Meeting, Sixth Session, at 1-5, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/1992/10 (June 26, 1992) (approving the UNCC's Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure,,
including Article 5(1)(a), which provided that "[a] Government may submit claims on behalf of its
nationals and, at its discretion, of other persons resident in its territory").
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provisions on the subject.
The drafters of the agreement establishing the IUSCT took care to create a
system in which compensation, if awarded, would actually be paid. First, the
Algiers Accords enlisted the support of domestic courts all around the globe.
Article IV(3) of the Claims Settlement Declaration states that "[a]ny award
which the Tribunal may render against either government shall be enforceable
against such government in the courts of any nation in accordance with its
laws.""' Second, the Algiers Accords specified that Iran would create a fund for
paying the Tribunal's awards. It provided that a "mutually agreeable Central
Bank" was to be established as the depositary of funds to facilitate the transfer
of financial assets between Iran and the United States.11 2 The escrow account
that was created in the Central Bank was also the conduit through which
Washington returned all remaining Iranian assets in the United States."' Half of
these assets went into a special interest-bearing security account that was to be
used solely for the purpose of paying claims against Iran. Whenever the balance
in the security account fell below the mandated $500 million limit, the Central
Bank would turn to Iran and require that it supply additional funds.114
Likewise, Security Council Resolution 687, establishing the UNCC,
provided for a Compensation Fund to finance both the operations of claims
processing and the payment of awards."' It was supported by a set-aside from
the sale of Iraqi petroleum.11 6 If Iraq failed to comply with its funding
obligations, the UNCC had alternative means, such as freezing assets derived
from Iraqi oil sales in particular States."'7 The Oil-for-Food Program was also
later introduced to ensure that Iraq contributed the necessary payments to the
Fund." 8
As for the EECC, the provision in Algiers II that was designed to deal with
the payment of awards could hardly have been more different. The entirety of its
discussion of implementation is a two-sentence provision: "Decisions and
awards of the commission shall be final and binding. The parties agree to honor
all decisions and to pay any monetary awards rendered against them
111. IUSCT Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 16, art. IV(3).
112. IUSCT General Declaration, supra note 70, at General Principles ¶ 2.
113. Id. at General Principles ¶ 6.
114. Id. at General Principles ¶ 7.
115. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 16, ¶ 18; see also S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the
Fund for payment of awards rendered by the UNCC and detailing the funding procedures).
116. See S.C. Res 692, supra note 115, ¶ 6. Security Council Resolution 687, however, provided
that, in determining Iraq's contribution to the Fund, the Secretary-General would "tak[e] into account the
requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the
international financial institutions . . . , and the needs of the Iraqi economy." S.C. Res. 687, supra note
16, T 19.
117. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 23 (May 22, 2003); S.C. Res.. 1546, T 29 (June 8, 2004).
118. The "Oil-for-Food" Program automatically allocated a certain percentage of Iraq's annual
revenues from oil exports to the Fund. See S.C. Res. 986 (Apr. 14, 1995) (establishing the Program); see
also S.C. Res. 705 (Aug. 15, 1991) (originally allocating up to thirty percent of annual oil revenues to the
Compensation Fund); S.C. Res. 1360, ¶ 9 (July 3, 2001) (decreasing the annual allocation to twenty-five
percent of oil revenues); S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 117, ¶ 21 (decreasing the percentage yet further to
five percent of annual oil revenues).
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promptly."119
The absence of any real effort to provide assurances of payment of the
awards is striking. When this absence is combined with the unrealistic mandate
requiring individualized awards within the time and resources allocated, it is hard
to imagine Algiers II as a serious plan to provide compensation for the persons
who had suffered losses during the war. To practical persons giving the matter
serious thought, it seems that the most likely outcome of the EECC process
would have been exactly the outcome that transpired.
One objection to this analysis is that it overlooks a very important-
perhaps, the single most important-feature distinguishing the EECC from its
predecessors: the relative economic situations of the States involved. Iran, the
United States, and Iraq all had the resources at the outset of the proceedings to
establish special funds to cover their legal liabilities. Even if they had been
unwilling or unable to set aside money for the satisfaction of future judgments,
they would have been in a reasonable position to pay awards after they were
announced. Is that not the real difference between those two commissions and
the EECC? Two of the poorest States in the world-Ethiopia and Eritrea-
lacked the resources necessary to either establish a fund at the outset or
ultimately pay the awards. They were, effectively, judgment-proof.
It is a difference, but it does not address the issue being argued here. It is
true that this lack of resources meant that the most logical method for settling
liabilities would be through informally setting off the award of one State against
the award of the other. The consequence of treating the two awards as a set-off
was necessarily that many, most, or even all of the claimants would receive
nothing. But while the result can be explained in terms of the relative poverty of
the State parties, this does not solve the real puzzle.
The poverty of the two State parties was certainly apparent during the
negotiations leading up to Algiers II. That the two States were judgment-proof
only makes the entire enterprise even more mysterious. If poverty is the true
explanation for the failure to compensate, the basic question still remains: if an
IMCC cannot reasonably be expected to result in compensation-if after huge
expenses for lawyers and high commission costs, years of waiting, and a terrific
expenditure of local people's energy, the result is almost certainly to be that the
claimants will actually be worse off-then what is the reason for embarking on
this project?
Indeed, those injured persons holding meritorious claims were worse off
than they would have been with no provision for any IMCC at all. Despite being
entitled, in theory, to compensation, all were barred by Algiers II from seeking
recovery in any other forum.' 2 0 Article 5 of Algiers II made the EECC their
exclusive forum; there was no other permissible forum to which they could go.
119. Algiers II, supra note 12, art. 5(17).
120. Algiers II, supra note 12, art. 5(8) ("[T]he Commission shall be the sole forum for
adjudicating claims described in paragraph I or filed under paragraph 9 of this Article . . . .").
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C. The Interests of the Involved Actors: Closure versus Compensation
The creation of the IUSCT and the UNCC was clearly motivated by the
desire for compensation. Although the United States wanted most importantly to
obtain release of the hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, compensation was
certainly a priority in the drafting of the Claims Settlement Declaration of the
IUSCT. The attention to provisions dealing with filing claims and creating a fund
for payment of awards indicates that the compensation commission was being
taken seriously and was expected to produce individual results. This is not
surprising. U.S. nationals, some of them politically influential individuals or
wealthy commercial interests, held many large claims. 121 At the UNCC,
likewise, many powerful commercial interests were represented.
The EECC, in contrast, was created as part of a general effort by interested
members of the international community to resolve the military conflict between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. The parties and the international community could not have
seen compensation for the injured victims as a first priority because, without first
establishing peace, a claims commission would not have been workable anyway.
The way that Algiers 11 was drafted set the stage for inaction on the award.1 22
The Commission's establishment in Article 5 of Algiers II was important as an
inducement to one or both of the parties to sign Algiers II as a whole, thereby
putting a definitive end to the States' border war, but it was a means to an end;
the interest in compensation was incidental to the comprehensive peace treaty.
Who was responsible for the failure of text to provide a grounding for
actual compensation? Not the Commission, certainly, which took the agreement
as it found it. The die had already been cast before the Commission was fully
constituted. The parties were of course responsible, having signed Algiers II.
But the international community also bears some of the responsibility for
121. There were about 650 large claims filed by U.S. nationals against Iran. U.S.-Iran Claims
Tribunal: Recent Developments, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm.
on Foreign Affairs (Dec. 7, 1982) (statement of James H. Michel, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of
State), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr. 1983, at 74. Large claims involved amounts greater than $250,000,
indicating the wealth ofthe individuals who filed such claims.
122. Ethiopia's acquiescence in the nonpayment was probably due in large part to the fact that it
was in a poor diplomatic position to demand compliance. At the time that the EECC was completing its
work, Ethiopia had already been in violation of the Boundary Commission's delimitation decision for
over six years. Ethiopia's violation started immediately upon announcement of the Delimitation Award.
See generally Rep. of the S.C., at Annex 1, Sixth Report of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission,
U.N. Doc. S/2002/977 (Aug. 30, 2002) (discussing Ethiopia's violation of the delimitation decision).
Ethiopia had refused to remove its troops from Eritrean territory after certain contested areas were
awarded to Eritrea, and, moreover, Ethiopia embarked upon a program of settling Ethiopians on the land
that had just been declared Eritrean. Id. 1 10. An Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)
instruction to remove these settlers, backed up by the U.N. Secretary-General, went ignored. See Eri.-Eth.
Boundary Comm'n, Border Delimitation Determinations, XXV R.I.A.A. 204, 204-05 (Nov. 7, 2002)
(noting Ethiopia's failure to remove Ethiopians from Eritrean territory and instructing Ethiopia to remove
settlers); U.N. Secretary-General, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,
¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2002/977 (Aug. 30, 2002) (supporting the EEBC's decision to "ensure that no
population resettlement takes place across the delimitation line"); cf S.C. Res. 1466, ¶ 2 (Mar. 14, 2003)
(urging "both Ethiopia and Eritrea to continue to assume their responsibilities and fulfil their commitments
under the Algiers Agreements" and "call[ing] upon them to cooperate fully and promptly with the
Boundary Commission") (emphasis omitted).
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the contours of Algiers II. Algiers I-the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement-
which contained the ceasefire terms that put an end to the fighting in June of that
year, explicitly stated that it was negotiated with the assistance of the United
Nations,. the OAU (now, the African Union), the United States, and others. 1 23
The United States was deeply involved in the negotiations leading up to Algiers
II; photographs of the signing ceremony show U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright prominently on the platform when the Eritrean President and the
Ethiopian Prime Minister affixed their signatures. 124 Of all countries, the United
States most surely understood the mechanics of drafting the provisions that
establish a mass claims tribunal; after all, it had been involved in the drafting
that led to the creation of the IUSCT and the UNCC.
When the EECC is compared with the other two illustrative commissions,
it is easy to conclude that the UNCC and the IUSCT were truly set up to award
compensation whereas the EECC was not. But that still leaves us with something
of a puzzle. It seems that the parties, and their legally sophisticated supporters in
the international community, had drafted a legal instrument setting up a claims
commission that was doomed to fail. The IMCC that they created was virtually
guaranteed to extinguish all of the meritorious legal claims of the parties without
providing anyone with compensation.
It might seem logical to think that support for establishing a tribunal is an
indicator of an interest in compensation, and that the proponents of IMCCs
would therefore care as much about getting the claimants paid as they did about
encouraging the parties to take their dispute to adjudication in the first place.
That does not always seem to be the case. 125 At the EECC, other States supported
the parties-or even urged them-to establish a claims tribunal but then showed
no interest when the award was not paid.
One possible explanation is some sort of bad faith, especially bias. A party
that seeks to avoid an award may have had powerful supporters with influence
123. See Algiers I, supra note 83, pmbl. (noting that the agreement was made pursuant to talks
organized by the OAU and with the participation of the United States and the European Union).
124. The U.N. thanked the United States for its "role in achieving the Algiers Agreement." Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Welcomes Peace Agreement Between Ethiopia arid Eritrea,
Urges Full, Expeditious Cooperation with United Nations Mission, U.N. Press Release SC/7011 (Feb. 9,
2001). Madeleine Albright, in her remarks at the signing of the agreement, also acknowledged the role of
the United States in negotiating it. Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at Ethiopia/Eritrea
Peace Agreement Ceremony (Dec. 12, 2000), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/
collections/peaceagreements/erethio albright_12122000.pdf("[T]he United States is proud ... to have
assisted in achieving this agreement. . . ."); see also Fikrejesus Amahazion, Justice Deferred: The 15th
Anniversary of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Verdict, FOREIGN POL'Y J. (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2017/04/14/justice-deferred-the- 1 5th-anniversary-of-the-eritrea-
ethiopia-boundary-commission-verdict/ ("[T]here was heavy-handed involvement by the U.S. during both
the conflict and throughout the peace negotiation process on the side ofEthiopia."); Sally Healy & Martin
Plaut, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion, CHATHAM HOUSE 2 (Jan. 2007),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/bpethiopiaeritrea.pdf
("Major powers, notably the United States, had put serious effort and resources into trying first to prevent
and later to resolve the dispute.").
125. Consider, for example, the EEBC. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia were pressured to establish a
boundary commission, but the States that were most active in bringing pressure to bear made no
investment in carrying out the award.
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in the international community. Perhaps at the outset these powerful supporters
thought that their ally would prevail and thus supported the idea; then, when their
prediction turned out to be mistaken, they decided not to support enforcement
because it was against their ally's interest.
Bias is certainly one possible explanation. But there are other explanations
that do not require assuming bad faith on the part of powerful third States.
Another explanation is based on the relative importance that States are likely to
attach to the different interests that are affected. Compensation, as was argued
earlier, is not the only interest supporting the formation of IMCCs, and in some
circumstances it may be the least influential factor in explaining the actions of
the international community.
IMCCs serve both the private interest in compensation and also the public
interest in closure. 126 The private interest in compensation is held by the
individual claimant and the State of which he or she is a national. It is an interest
in compensation for meritorious claims and not some sort of humanitarian
interest that attaches simply because of the need of the victim. It is a consequence
of the fact that the defendant State conducted itself unlawfully under
international law, and this conduct brought about the claimant's injury.
Other States that are not parties to the dispute, but simply take an interest
as members of the international community, do not gain direct benefits when the
claimants are compensated. An intangible interest in compensation, in principle,
may exist, but even if that is true, it is likely to be more diluted than the private
interest in winning a tangible remedy. A State may be reluctant to act on a
commitment to compensation in principle; States may simply not want to take a
position on which of the two parties is right and which is wrong. Where there are
disputes of fact or law about the merits of the claims, other States may consider
themselves ill-informed, or they may have reasons (good or bad) to remain
neutral between the disputants. In any truly difficult international problem, it can
be problematic for the community to undertake anything other than manifestly
neutral action.
Support for the formation of an adjudicative tribunal-independent of the
merits of the various claims-may be one of the few neutral steps available to
the international community. Unlike support for compensation, encouraging
adjudication does not require taking sides about the merits of the legal claims.
Support for an adjudicative solution also has other advantages. The public has
an interest in closure, in particular closure by legal means and not by resort to
force. Adjudication is likely to promote closure, effectively resolving not only
126. These private and public interests have different characteristics, and these differences are to
some extent a consequence of which international actors possess the relevant interests. The discussion in
the text focuses on the differences between compensation and closure. However, deterrence has its own
unique features. Deterrence has its effect on future actors who are not parties to the present conflict. As
such, it depends on the public perception of correct punishment. Deciding what action to take therefore
requires making a judgment about the merits of the claims. Deterrence, however, requires not that the
penalty be paid (let alone, that it be paid by the correct party), but rather only requires that the public
believe that it has been paid and by the correct party. Deterrence requires that future wrongdoers believe
that they will be punished; so long as they believe that the guilty party has been punished in the past, it is
not important whether their belief is correct.
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claims that are filed, but also, through preclusive effect, any claims that are not
filed.
The private interest in compensation requires that meritorious claims be
recognized and that the claimant's award be paid; the interest in closure does not.
Closure is achieved simply through the establishment of the tribunal-regardless
of the merits of the claims, regardless of whether a claim is even filed, and
regardless of whether the award is paid. The international community may fail
to support enforcement of an award, despite having urged the parties to establish
a commission, because compensation was not the reason that it supported
forming a commission in the first place. The true reason is likely to be closure.
CONCLUSION
It is risky to generalize about IMCCs so early in their history. However,
based on the above account, several discrete observations are appropriate. First,
the fact that an institution qualifies to be called an "international mass claims
commission" does not mean that compensation is the only interest that it serves.
There are other possible interests underlying the formation and functioning of
international ad hoc adjudicative institutions. Indeed, furthering these other
interests of the international community may in some circumstances require
compromise of the goal of compensation.
Second, an IMCC may further the interests of those who supported it by
foreclosing claims. By cutting off future legal recourse, an IMCC serves the
interests of both the State party against whom the claim is directed and the
international community desirous of stopping conflict. But this will not
compensate the victims.
Third, simply forming an IMCC does not address the problem of
compensation if the available resources are inadequate to support the IMCC's
work and payment of awards. No matter how well designed an institution might
be, it cannot resolve large numbers of difficult cases on the merits without
financial support. This includes, in particular, cases where the only asset likely
to be available to pay an award is a State's own award against the other party; in
such cases, the only thing that will be accomplished is foreclosure of the victims'
hope for compensation.
Finally, despite the euphoria of the moment-imminent release of
hostages, ouster of a neighboring aggressor from occupied territory, or
termination of a bloody war-should not the participants step back and ask
whether it is worth embarking on an enterprise of this sort? The answer will not
always be "yes." In certain circumstances, it will be rather predictable that even
victims with meritorious claims will not receive compensation. Because they will
be foreclosed from searching for another forum, the victims will, if anything, be
worse off than if there had been no IMCC at all. The beneficiaries will turn out
to have been the State parties acting as defendants, whose liability will have been
paid by the set-off and then extinguished, as well as the international community,
whose main interest was that the problem go away. All this comes at great human
and material expense. This extended analysis of the three modern mass claims
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commissions hopefully shines some light on how and when this would be the
result-and perhaps provides some practical suggestions that might, in certain
situations, assist in efforts to forestall it.
IMCCs must serve public interests if they are to be supported. But what
should happen when public interests, as determined by the international
community, are inconsistent with private objectives? This is not the place for a
general theory for reconciling public and private interests, nor can this Article
answer the question of how a State's interests should be balanced against the
interests of its nationals when States make claims on their behalf.127
It is to be expected that IMCCs will sometimes necessitate the
subordination of private to public interests. In order to gain international support,
compensation may have to be compromised. This is true despite the fact that
compensation is, ostensibly, the very reason for an IMCC's existence. The irony
of IMCCs is that ad hoc tribunals come into existence and act solely at the
instance of the parties. Yet in some cases the public interest, especially closure,
is a better explanation for the eventual outcome of mass claims litigation. This
much is suggested by a comparison of the results of three modern IMCCs, and
by the logic of IMCCs, properly understood.
127. See BRILMAYER, GIORGETTI & CHARLTON, supra note 15, at 202-09, for a discussion on
the use of private claims recovery to "set off" the liability of the claimant's State.
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